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ABSTRACT
One of the core requirements of patentability is that patent applicants
provide background and contextual information about their invention to
the patent office. This disclosure is expected to allow a patent examiner to
ensure that the application meets patentability standards. However, because of the information asymmetry between expert patent applicants and
generalist patent examiners, applicants can withhold useful information
while still receiving the benefits of exclusive patent rights. While this is a
problem in the patent system in general, the challenge is even worse in a
subset of inventions. The information asymmetry is more pronounced in
cases of inventions that rely on the genetic resource or traditional
knowledge (TK) of indigenous peoples and local communities in their research. A good example is the practice of using traditional medicinal
knowledge as research leads to develop modern drugs. Aspirin is one of
the drugs developed out of traditional practices. A core question in these
situations is whether patent applicants that rely on TK to develop their
invention are required to disclose such information to the patent examiner.
Reports of multiple instances show that patent applicants usually withhold
information about their reliance on TK in their inventive process. As a
result, they may claim exclusive property rights over what source communities have been practicing for generations. In reaction to the lack of recognition of their contribution, source communities are adopting a protectionist trend by creating restrictions on access to their resources.
This Article argues that the introduction of an explicit requirement in
U.S. patent law, compelling patent applicants to disclose their use of TK,
can create an efficient patent system and sustainable relationships in the
relevant industries. It provides two justifications for the amendment of
U.S. patent law. First, the Article makes a normative case for conceiving
the disclosure of origin requirement as an information-forcing rule. Imposing an obligation to disclose the source of TK would elicit socially beneficial information about the validity and scope of a claimed application
from the low-cost providers—patent applicants—thereby creating a more
† Visiting Assistant Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. For
useful comments, I am grateful to (in alphabetical order) Ana Santos-Rutscheman, Ariel Katz, Camilla
Hrdy, Cathay Smith, Christopher Buccafusco, Deborah Pearlstein, Dmitry Karshtedt, Guy Rub, Jessica Roth, Joshua Sarnoff, Joy Xiang, Laura Pedraza-Farina, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Michael Pollack, Michelle Greenberg-Kobrin, Paul Gugliuzza, Peter Karol, Peter Yu, Samuel Weinstein, Sarah
Burstein, and participants at the Law and Society Association annual meeting, the Southeastern Association of Law Schools workshop, the Intellectual Property Scholars Conference, and the George
Washington University Law School’s Intellectual Property Speakers Series. I am also thankful to Julia
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efficient patent system. Second, the Article argues that an explicit and enforceable disclosure requirement would reverse the inefficient and troubling protectionist trend by facilitating the tracking and enforcement of
obligations that researchers may have in contracts with source communities or domestic laws of source countries. The requirement will create confidence in the patent system and encourage source communities to facilitate access to TK. The Article uses efficiency and social-welfare perspectives in contrast to the equity and distributive justice justifications dominating the literature. The focus of this Article on domestic U.S. law is another point of contrast to the focus of the literature on international law.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1985, Robert Larson, a timber importer based in Sheboygan, Wisconsin, received U.S. Patent 4,556,562 for a storage stable neem tree extract and the process of making such extract to be used as a pesticide.1 Mr.
Larson imported samples of the tree and researched its pesticidal qualities
for over a decade.2 Three years after his patent was granted, he assigned
the patent rights to the chemical conglomerate W.R. Grace,3 which had
received similar patents on a storage stable neem tree extract in the United
States4 and other jurisdictions.5 Neemix, the pesticide that W.R. Grace developed using neem tree extract, grossed around $60 million in annual
global sales.6 Mr. Larson had learned of the use of the neem trees as a
pesticide while importing timber from India.7 Although farmers in India
have been using the neem tree as a pesticide for centuries,8 Mr. Larson did
not mention this fact or how he learned of the use of the neem tree as a
pesticide in his patent application.9 When the granting of patent rights was
disclosed to the public, many scholars, activists, farmers, and government
leaders protested what they argued was a new form of imperialism and an
act of “piracy by patents.”10 The public outcry resulted in the creation of
an international coalition from thirty-five countries, and hundreds of scientific and agricultural groups supported by over 100,000 Indian farmers
brought a legal challenge at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).11
The legal petition alleged that W.R. Grace is holding a patent right
over what Indian farmers have been doing for centuries. While there are
philosophical objections against the granting of rights over life forms, on
1. Stable Anti-Pest Neem Seed Extract, U.S. Patent No. 4,556,562 (filed Mar. 19, 1984) (issued Dec. 3, 1985).
2. Vandana Shiva, The Neem Tree—A Case History of Biopiracy, THIRD WORLD NETWORK,
http://www.twn.my/title/pir-ch.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2019).
3. Id.
4. Storage Stable Azadirachtin Formulation, U.S. Patent No. 5,124,349 (filed Oct. 31, 1990)
(issued Jun. 23, 1992).
5. See, e.g., Storage Stable Azadirachtin Formulation, Eur. Patent No. EP0405291 B1 (filed
Dec. 20, 1990) (issued Jan. 2, 1991) (the European counterpart of the same patent application).
6. Mara Bovsun, FET Challenges U.S. Patent on India’s Natural Pesticide, BIOTECHNOLOGY
NEWSWATCH, Sept. 18, 1995; Ralph T. King Jr., Grace’s Patent on a Pesticide Enrages Indians,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 1995, at B1.
7. Shiva, supra note 2.
8. BD. ON SCI. & TECH. FOR INT’L DEV., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NEEM: A TREE FOR
SOLVING GLOBAL PROBLEMS 32 (1992).
9. It should be noted here that at the time the Larson patent was examined, U.S. patent law did
not consider unpublished information from outside of the United States for patentability analysis. The
2011 America Invents Act has changed that, and under current law, unpublished information from
anywhere in the world can be used in examining the validity of a patent application. Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29 § 3(b)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 285–87 (2011) (codified as amended
at 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2018)).
10. Vandana Shiva & Radha Holla-Bhar, Piracy by Patent: The Case of the Neem Tree, in THE
CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: AND FOR A TURN TOWARD THE LOCAL 146, 150–51 (Jerry
Mander & Edward Goldsmith eds., 1996); Lori Wolfgang, Patents on Native Technology Challenged,
269 SCI. 1506, 1506 (1995).
11. See Request for Reexamination of Patent No. 5,124,349, 1182 OFF. GAZ. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFFICE 536, 536–37 (1996).
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a technical level, the challenge argued that the invention lacked novelty
and was obvious considering traditional practices in India.12 W.R. Grace,
on its part, claimed that the company’s research resulted in increasing the
shelf life for the extract from a couple of days to about two years.13 The
PTO agreed with W.R. Grace and found that the claimed invention had a
significant level of advancement over the traditional practice and that it
met the patentability requirement.14 The European counterpart patent was
invalidated based on evidence showing a scientific project that disclosed
a storage stable neem tree extract decades before the patent application.15
An important point here is that, at the time the patent was granted,
U.S. patent law did not consider unpublished information outside of the
United States in patentability analysis.16 That has since changed with the
amendments to the patent law in the 2011 America Invents Act (AIA).17
Under current U.S. law, unpublished information, such as the public use
of the invention, anywhere in the world can be used as a prior art18 reference against a claimed invention.19 This may include traditional practices
such as the use of neem tree extracts as pesticides in India. However, because the relevance of traditional practices for patentability has not been
litigated in court, it is still not clear if the challenge would have come out
differently if filed today. In practice, patent examiners hardly consult unpublished sources that may disclose the claimed invention before the patent application. So, even after the AIA, an invention that relies on the oral
history and traditional practices of indigenous and local communities
could still be granted without the source information being considered in
patentability analysis. In fact, the proposals in this Article are timely con-

12. Id.
13. John F. Burns, Tradition in India vs. a Patent in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 1995),
https://www.nytimes.com/1995/09/15/business/international-business-tradition-in-india-vs-a-patentin-the-us.html.
14. See Stable Anti-Pest Neem Seed Extract, supra note 1.
15. Although there are differences in the patent laws of the United States and the European
Union (EU), years of international patent law harmonization has resulted in very similar patent systems
on patentability requirements with only a few differences between the two jurisdictions. One of the
main tools through which patent laws have been harmonized internationally is the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 3 (1994); India Wins
Landmark Patent Battle, BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/4333627.stm (last updated
Mar. 9, 2005, 4:04 PM); Neem Tree Patent Revoked, BBC (May 11, 2000, 1:34 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/745028.stm.
16. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2018); Margo A. Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional: The Geographical Limitation on Prior Art in a Small World, 87 MINN. L. REV. 679, 680–83 (2002).
17. The AIA was passed by Congress and signed into law by President Barack Obama in September 2011. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
18. Simply stated, prior art is any acceptable evidence that the claimed invention was known or
used by someone other than the patent applicant prior to the patent application. One of the key sections
of the Patent Act that describes prior art states that an invention would not be patentable if it was
“described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before
the effective filing date of the claimed invention.” See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1).
19. Id.
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sidering the AIA reforms. While the AIA has expanded the body of relevant prior art references to cover undocumented knowledge outside of the
United States, patent examiners have no realistic way of accessing undocumented TK in other jurisdictions. In this sense, the disclosure requirement outlined in this Article is necessary to bring meaning to the AIA’s
expansion of prior art.
There are several cases where patent applicants relied on the genetic
resource and TK of indigenous peoples and local communities and failed
to disclose the source of the information.20 The term genetic resources refers to “any material of plant, animal, microbial or other origin containing
functional units of heredity,”21 while the term “traditional knowledge” refers to the know-how, skills, innovations, and practices of indigenous peoples and local communities.22 For the sake of brevity, both genetic resources and traditional knowledge will be referred to as “traditional
knowledge” or “TK” for short.23 The term “indigenous peoples” refers to
native communities that reside with settler communities in physical or cultural enclaves, while “local communities” refers to traditional communities outside of the mainstream culture that reside in countries from which
colonizing powers have left. The practice of using traditional medicinal
knowledge as research leads to develop modern drugs is called bioprospecting, ethnopharmacology, or ethnomedicine, and most discussions
around TK deal with these types of relationships.24 Reliance on TK in the
inventive process creates questions of patent validity, duty of disclosure,
and entitlement to creative outcomes.
This Article proposes an amendment to U.S. patent law, which introduces an explicit obligation that patent applicants disclose the source of
20. Other examples include: a patent right for the use of turmeric powder for wound healing, a
practice widely used in Indian communities; a patent right over an appetite-suppressant compound
extracted from the Hoodia tree, a practice used by the San People of South Africa for centuries; and a
patent right over a process of producing teff flour, a famous ingredient used to make injera bread by
millions of Ethiopians. For a non-exhaustive list of cases in which patent rights were accused of biopiracy, see JAY MCGOWAN, OUT OF AFRICA: MYSTERIES OF ACCESS AND BENEFIT SHARING, at i (Edmonds Inst., 2006); DANIEL F. ROBINSON, CONFRONTING BIOPIRACY: CHALLENGES, CASES AND
INTERNATIONAL DEBATES 45–76 (2010); see generally ABENA DOVE AGYEPOMA OSSEO-ASSARE,
BITTER ROOTS: THE SEARCH FOR HEALING PLANTS IN AFRICA (2014) (discussing five major cases of
biopiracy arising from the African continent).
21. See Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 143, 146.
22. This definition is a narrow one and used to facilitate a pointed discussion about know-how
of indigenous peoples and local communities. However, the definition of the term is highly contentious, and varied forms of definitions are used in the scholarship and in international deliberations. See
Aman Gebru, International Intellectual Property Law and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge:
From Cultural Conservation to Knowledge Codification, 15 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 294,
330 (2015).
23. This Article is not the first one to use the term TK to refer to traditional knowledge and
genetic resources. Some scholars have used the term TK to collectively refer to genetic resources,
traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural expressions. See CHIDI OGUAMANAM, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PLANT BIODIVERSITY, AND
TRADITIONAL MEDICINE 172–76 (2d ed. 2006).
24. See Thomas Efferth & Henry Johannes Greten, Traditional Medicine with Plants—Present
and Past, MED. & AROMATIC PLANTS, May 25, 2014, at 1, 1.
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TK on which they rely. Such a requirement will facilitate sustainable relationships in industries that rely on TK and will create a more efficient patent system. The Article reaches this conclusion from a welfarist point of
view, as opposed to the equity and distributive justice perspective that
dominates the literature in this field of patents and TK. In doing so, I hope
to engage a broader set of stakeholders beyond those interested in equity
and distributive justice.
The Article relates the issues to a core mission of U.S. patent law:
disclosure.25 U.S. patent law grants exclusive rights to individuals that develop inventive products or processes. A key aspect of the system is a quid
pro quo26—a social compact—in which inventors receive exclusive rights
for twenty years in exchange for disclosing their inventions to the public.27
This social compact faces a risk because patent applicants have both the
motive and the opportunity to withhold essential information.28 They have
the motive because the validity and scope of a patent right depends on the
level of information available to a patent examiner, and they have an interest to withhold potentially damaging information. Patent applicants
have the opportunity because there is considerable information asymmetry
in patent examination.29 Most of the information used by patent examiners
tends to be provided by patent applicants who have more information
about the invention than the examiner could develop during the limited
period of examination.30
To guard against this incentive to withhold information, the patent
system includes obligations to disclose background and contextual information about the claimed invention.31 Despite these measures, applicants
use drafting techniques to receive rights over unpatentable inventions or
to get vague patent rights that create a broader scope than the invention
deserves.32 Several scholars have reported this problem of withholding
information to receive patent rights for undeserving claims.33 This problem, however, is exacerbated in inventions that rely on TK. Because, unlike other prior art references, TK resources are undocumented or are documented in foreign languages, examiners rarely use such resources in
25.
26.
27.

See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 560–62 (2009).
See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186–87 (1933).
Jacob Adam Schroeder, Written Description: Protecting the Quid Pro Quo Since 1793, 21
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 63, 85 (2010).
28. See infra Section III.A.1 on information-forcing rules in patent law.
29. R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration and the Failure of Festo,
151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 218–19 (2002).
30. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495,
1499–1500 (2001).
31. See Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codification, 23 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1009, 1021 (2008).
32. John R. Thomas, Of Text, Technique, and the Tangible: Drafting Patent Claims Around
Patent Rules, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO L. 219, 226, 231 (1998).
33. Katherine Nolan-Stevaux, Inequitable Conduct Claims in the 21st Century: Combating the
Plague, 20 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 147, 147 (2005); Wagner, supra note 29, at 214.
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patent examinations, which in turn increases the information asymmetry
and the incentive to withhold information.
Because U.S. patent law has a broad disclosure requirement,34
arguably, patent applicants that rely on TK resources in the inventive process must disclose such information. However, there is legal uncertainty
surrounding the issue, especially about the level of reliance required to
trigger the obligation. An explicit requirement of disclosing reliance on
TK would remove doubts and provide better guidance for both researchers
and source communities. Reports of multiple instances of biopiracy35
show that patent applicants usually fail to disclose their reliance on TK in
their inventive process, and it is only ex post when the patent is challenged
that such information is disclosed. Patentees in the United States have repeatedly been accused of engaging in biopiracy—the act of applying for
and receiving patent rights over TK without the knowledge or consent of
the source community.36
This Article argues that the heightened level of information asymmetry calls for the introduction of an explicit requirement that patent applicants disclose the source of TK they use in their research. Disclosure of
source is expected to include disclosure of the level of reliance on TK. For
the sake of brevity, this requirement to disclose reliance on TK will be
referred to as “the requirement” throughout this Article. The Article makes
two arguments that should convince legislators and policy makers to introduce such reform. First, the Article makes the normative case for conceiving the requirement as an information-forcing rule. Understood this
way, the benefits of the requirement are that it would elicit socially beneficial information about the validity and scope of a claimed application
from the low-cost providers of such information—patent applicants—
thereby creating a more efficient patent prosecution process. Full disclosure of the prior art also helps ensure that only deserving inventions get a
patent, and thus improves the quality of patents and reduces the social
costs of meritless patents. Here, the Article builds on the literature examining the use of information-forcing rules to mitigate inefficiencies resulting from information asymmetry.
Conceiving the requirement as an information-forcing rule provides
key insights about the governance of TK use. It points to the need to establish a requirement to compel information from the well-informed
34. Jason Rantanen, Patent Law’s Disclosure Requirement, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 369, 370
(2013).
35. ROBINSON, supra note 20.
36. The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines the term “biopiracy” as “the unethical or unlawful
appropriation or commercial exploitation of biological materials (such as medicinal plant extracts) that
are native to a particular country or territory without providing fair financial compensation to the people or government of that country or territory.” Biopiracy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/biopiracy (last visited Mar. 22, 2019). This corresponds to the use of the
term in the scholarships. Paul J. Heald, The Rhetoric of Biopiracy, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L COMP. L.
519, 521 (2003) (critiquing the use of the term “biopiracy”).
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party37: the patent applicant. The information-forcing rule’s literature also
suggests that the requirement should only require patent applicants to disclose the source from which they received TK and not the origin of the
resource.38 Requiring inventors to conduct more research to discover the
origin of TK would create new transaction costs that may discourage them
from engaging in TK-related research in the first place.39 Furthermore, the
literature also suggests that if the requirement is to provide its information-forcing effect, the penalty for nondisclosure should be robust40 and
include either a rejection of the patent application, patent invalidity, or unenforceability of granted patents.
The second reason to introduce the requirement is that it will reverse
a rising protectionist trend which threatens the sustainability of research
that relies on TK. This is a trend in which source communities are increasing restrictions on access to TK resources.41 A requirement to disclose the
source of TK used in an inventive process will play a key role in tracking
use and enforcing obligations that inventors may have in the laws of source
countries or in contracts with source countries. A requirement that enables
source communities to have some power to enforce access and benefit-sharing conditions would undo this protectionist trend and create a
more collaborative and efficient relationship between researchers and
source communities. This, in turn, is expected to create and sustain a promising relationship in relevant industries and improve resource conservation. At a higher level of generalization, requiring disclosure is a way of
establishing a more inclusive system of recognition and reward for innovation. Instead of rewarding the inventor at the end of the inventive process,42 a different framework would seek to reward those that provide useful contribution earlier in that process.
Amending the U.S. Patent Act to explicitly introduce the requirement
may be the most effective mechanism considering the twin goals of reversing a rising protectionist trend and compelling socially beneficial information from patent applicants. However, amending U.S. patent law
may be infeasible given the lack of political interest to introduce such an
amendment and the considerable opposition that may be expected from
industry. Therefore, clarifying the duties of disclosure, candor, and good
37. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 94 (1989).
38. The source of a TK is the entity through which the patent applicant received access while
the origin is the source community that was first to develop the resource. The source of a TK could be
an intermediary such as a gene bank or an archive that is unrelated to the source community.
39. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 92.
40. Id. at 123–24.
41. Charles McManis, Biodiversity, Biotechnology and Traditional Knowledge Protection:
Law, Science and Practice, in BIODIVERSITY AND THE LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 5, 5–7 (Charles McManis ed., 2007).
42. JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 125–26 (1997) (criticizing the focus of IP laws for limiting recognition
and reward for innovative activity to individuals making transformative contributions).
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faith43 that patent applications already have by explicitly introducing the
requirement would be a feasible second-best measure. The Article also argues that the PTO, as the most suitable administrative agency for patent
examination, should check for compliance with the requirement as well.
Part I introduces the U.S. patent system and the disclosure requirement under current law. It discusses existing disclosure problems created
by the information asymmetry between patent applicants and examiners.
The Part concludes by highlighting that the information asymmetry is even
more pronounced in applications that rely on TK. Part II outlines the value
of TK resources for modern industries and the dramatic rate at which they
are disappearing. The Part also posits that there is a troubling and inefficient protectionist trend in which source communities are increasingly restricting access to their TK. Part III proposes to solve the disclosure problem in the context of TK use by amending U.S. patent law to include a
requirement that patent applicants disclose the source of TK they use in
their research. Part III makes the normative case for conceiving the requirement as an information-forcing rule. It explains how conceiving the
requirement this way could provide important guidance on what features
an effective requirement should include. The Part also points out that a
carefully designed disclosure requirement has the potential to reverse the
rising protectionist trend. Lastly, Part IV discusses the institutional mechanisms through which the requirement should be formulated in U.S. law.
I. PATENTS, INCENTIVES, AND DISCLOSURE
Think of a researcher who is about to decide whether to invest in research and development of a new product. If the idea behind the product
can be copied, the researcher may face the risk that others may use it to
produce the product and compete in the market against the researcher.44 If
the competition is high enough, the researcher may not recoup the cost of
research and development, which may force the researcher to decide
against investing in the project in the first place.45 One option the researcher has is to keep the information secret and use the information to
produce products.46 The Coca-Cola Company has been able to produce
and sell its products while keeping the formula secret for well over a century.47

43. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2018).
44. See generally Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. & STAT. 348
(1968) (outlining an economic examination of the incentives involved in investing in innovation).
45. For a detailed discussion of the reasoning behind the monopolistic patent rights, see generally WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 70–90 (1969).
46. See generally James Bessen, Patents and the Diffusion of Technical Information, 86 ECON.
LETTERS 121 (2005) (developing an economic model comparing patent rights and trade secrecy as
options for innovation and finding that patent right do not necessarily do a better job).
47. Steven N. S. Cheung, Property Rights in Trade Secrets, 20 ECON. INQUIRY 40, 40–53
(1982).

544

DENVER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:3

However, the option of relying on secrecy has some limitations.48 For
one, the product must be of a kind that cannot be reverse engineered by
others because, if it is, then others could just buy a product, reverse engineer it,49 and discover the secret information. More importantly, for innovation policy purposes, researchers keeping the results of their research
secret limits the potential for innovation. The sharing of information
among researchers spurs innovation by enabling researchers to learn and
be inspired by information they receive from one another.50
Patent law is designed to address the disincentive to invest in ideas
that may be copied and the incentive to keep new information secret. Patent rights allow the patentee to practice an invention exclusively and enable her to recoup the costs of developing an idea that could have been
copied by others. From the perspective of innovation policy, patents are
desirable because they encourage researchers to invest in developing ideas
that would otherwise not be developed, and they encourage those with useful information to disclose it to the public, thereby facilitating innovation.51
This utilitarian perspective is the standard justification for patent
rights in the United States,52 where rights are granted to “encourage the
progress of . . . useful arts.”53 The expectation is that inventors will invest
resources to develop inventions in anticipation of the reward of an exclusive right to exclude others from using the invention. In economic parlance, the problem patent law seeks to solve is one of the nonexcludable
nature of inventions. Patent law allows inventors to internalize the benefits
of their research.54
Policy makers have implemented limitations to balance the incentive
that patents grant to inventors with the interest of the public. One of the
key limitations is the term limit on patent rights, which is a constitutionally

48. See Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61
STAN. L. REV. 311, 311–13 (2008).
49. David D. Friedman, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Trade
Secret Law, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 61, 62.
50. Hsiu-Fen Lin, Knowledge Sharing and Firm Innovation Capability: An Empirical Study,
28 INT’L J. MANPOWER 315, 315–32 (2007).
51. The view of patents as an anti-secrecy tool has been studied by patent law scholars for
decades. See, e.g., Anthony Arundel, The Relative Effectiveness of Patents and Secrecy for Appropriation, 30 RES. POL’Y 611, 611–24 (2001).
52. This standard justification has been challenged by scholars who suggest other competing
justifications for the granting of patent rights. See, e.g., Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual
Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31, 31–32 (1989); Alfred E. Kahn, Fundamental Deficiencies of the
American Patent Law, 30 AM. ECON. REV. 475, 475 (1940); Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The
Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 1–2 (1950).
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
54. WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 294 (2003).
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mandated feature of patent laws.55 The most common type of patent rights,
utility patents, last twenty years after the date of application. This limitation allows the public to freely use the information disclosed in the patent
application after the expiration of the exclusive patent right. Even while
the patent has not expired, the public is free to “invent around” it—to use
the information in the patent application to develop similar solutions without infringing the right. Furthermore, patent rights are granted to inventions that meet certain substantive and formal requirements.
There are three core requirements of patentability: novelty (newness),
nonobviousness, and usefulness (utility).56 Inventions must meet all three
of these requirements to be eligible for patentability. To be considered
novel, the claimed invention must be different from anything disclosed to
the public through a publication, in another patent application, in products
or services sold on the market, or in other ways.57 An invention will be
nonobvious if it involves such a high level of inventive step that a person
with the average knowledge and skill in that field would be unable to
recreate it easily.58 To meet the usefulness requirement, an invention must
be “minimally operable towards some practical purpose.”59
In addition to these statutory requirements, courts have excluded certain types of information from patentability—the three interrelated excluded subject matters are “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.”60 The excluded subject matters are meant to reserve the basic
building blocks of research and natural processes from becoming the private property of a patent applicant.61 Therefore, to get a patent right over
a naturally occurring substance, applicants have to show that they have
created something new using that substance. A common example is the
development of synthetic versions of naturally occuring compounds. Innovative applications of abstract ideas, laws of nature, and physical phenomena may be patentable if they meet other patentability requirements.62
Furthermore, the application must disclose the invention and the
manner of making and using it.63 The requirement to disclose information
about the claimed invention is a key part of patent law, and it is stated in
55. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Constitution grants Congress the power “To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” Id. (emphasis added).
56. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2018).
57. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
58. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
59. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION
AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 3 (2003).
60. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216–17 (2014) (citing Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)). Courts have used these
three phrases loosely and, at times, interchangeably.
61. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 216; Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 566 U.S.
70, 71 (2012).
62. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 216–17 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)).
63. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2018).

546

DENVER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:3

many forms. This principle is especially important for the discussions in
this Article, and thus the following Section provides a detailed discussion
of the content and scope of the duty to disclose under U.S. patent law.
A. The Duty of Disclosure
The core disclosure requirement in U.S. patent law is outlined under
35 U.S.C. § 112(a) of the Patent Act.64 It states that patent applications
“shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and
process of making and using it, in . . . full, clear, concise, and exact
terms.”65 In addition to describing the invention and the surrounding prior
art in detail, the patent application is required to list references that situate
the claimed invention. These references usually include other patents,
printed publications, and other sources that hold information relevant for
the examination of the patent application.
The requirement in 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) is supplemented by the duty
of disclosure, candor, and good faith that is codified in 37 C.F.R. § 1.56,
which is colloquially called “Rule 56.”66 Under this duty, patent applicants
must disclose any information that is deemed to be material for patentability. Information is deemed to be “material” if it “establishes, by itself or in
combination with other information, a prima facie case of unpatentability
of a claim” or if it “refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant
takes.”67 Although this definition seems to significantly limit the scope of
the information required to be disclosed, the duty to disclose has a very
broad interpretation. In clarifying the rule further, the relevant provision
states that a prima facie case of unpatentability exists if an examiner would
find a single claim in the application unpatentable giving the claim “its
broadest reasonable construction . . . and before any consideration is given
to evidence” which may rebut this finding.68 The rule establishes a very
broad understanding of what amounts to material information.
What makes Rule 56 even broader is its reference to the duty of
candor and good faith. The PTO has explained, through its Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP), that the duties of candor and good
faith are broader than the duty to disclose material information.69 Furthermore, as the Federal Circuit explained in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.,70 “Materiality is not limited to prior art but
embraces any information that a reasonable examiner would be substan-

64. Id. § 112(a).
65. Id.
66. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2018).
67. Id. § 1.56(b)(1)–(2).
68. Id. § 1.56(b)(3).
69. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINATION PROCEDURE
§ 2001.04 (2018) [hereinafter MPEP], https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep-2000.pdf.
70. 326 F.3d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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tially likely to consider important in deciding whether to allow an application to issue as a patent.”71 Additionally, this expanded duty exists no matter how the patent applicant came across the information.72 The applicant,
for example, cannot engage in willful ignorance and avoid accessing explicit notice of material information.73
Parallel to statutory law, courts have used their power in equity to
develop an independent and, at times, different duty than the one developed under the Patent Act and the PTO rules.74 The Supreme Court in Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Co.75 held that a patent would be
unenforceable if the patentee has “unclean hands.”76 The Court held that
there is a strong “public policy against the assertion and enforcement of
patent claims infected with fraud and perjury.”77 Although the uncleanhands doctrine was narrow when it was initially developed, courts have
expanded the doctrine to apply to a wide range of cases in which the patent
applicant was not upfront in her correspondence with the PTO.78 In a key
decision expanding the doctrine, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
stated that the unclean hands doctrine “cannot be applied too narrowly if
the relationship . . . between applicants and the Patent Office is to have
any real meaning.”79 Under this expanded duty, currently called inequitable conduct, a patent could be unenforceable if an applicant withholds information the courts deem relevant.80 The Federal Circuit in Hycor Corp.
v. Schlueter Co.81 declared that “the highest standards of honesty and candor on the part of applicants in presenting such facts to the office are thus
necessary elements in a working patent system. We would go so far as to
say they are essential.”82 As the above discussions reveal, Rule 56, the case
law, and the PTO manual repeatedly emphasize that patent applicants have
the highest level of duty of disclosure, candor, and good faith.
The function of the disclosure requirement could be grouped into
two: a teaching function and a limiting function.83 The teaching function
speaks to the value of disclosure in revealing useful information about the
state of the art to the public. As the Supreme Court declared in Kewanee
71. Id. at 1234.
72. MPEP, supra note 69, § 2001.06.
73. Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (discussing that if an applicant or the attorney knows that there is relevant information, they cannot ignore
such notice to avoid the duty to disclose).
74. ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW & POLICY 1104 (4th ed. 2007).
75. 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
76. Id. at 819.
77. Id.
78. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 74.
79. Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 795 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
80. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 74. The inequitable conduct doctrine is not without criticism.
See generally Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 33, at 161–62 (arguing that the inequitable conduct doctrine
has been abused by defendants because it is used in almost all patent infringement lawsuits).
81. 740 F.2d 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
82. Id. at 1538 (quoting Norton, 433 F.2d at 794).
83. Rantanen, supra note 34, at 375.
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Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,84 the disclosure is meant to add to the public’s
“general store of knowledge.”85 In its limiting function, disclosure works
to limit the scope of the claim in the patent application (the metes and
bounds of the right granted to the inventor). Because patents are only
granted to new inventions, the applicant cannot claim rights over information disclosed to the public before the patent application.
B. Disclosure Problems in Current Law
Despite the heightened level of the disclosure requirement in U.S.
patent law, research86 has shown that patent applicants withhold information from the PTO and, as a result, receive a right where one is not
deserved or receive a broader right than the invention they developed. This
dynamic is created because of the inherent information asymmetry between the patent applicant and the examiner.87 The inventor who applies
for an invention would usually have dedicated a considerable amount of
time researching in the field to develop a new, nonobvious, and useful invention. Furthermore, patent applicants use vague wording and other
claim-drafting techniques to introduce confusion about the scope of the
claimed invention that they could later exploit to their advantage.88 This
information asymmetry and the ex parte nature of patent prosecution provides both the motive and the opportunity for patent applicants to withhold
important information from the examiner. This issue has been highlighted
by many patent law scholars89 and is examined in further detail in a later
Section.90
II. PROBLEMS IN THE CONTEXT OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE
The problems of withholding important information from patent examiners is exacerbated in inventions that rely on TK resources. This is
because the inherent information asymmetry in the patent system is even
more stark in the case of TK use. One of the common features of TK resources is that they are inaccessible. In contrast to the emphasis on documenting knowledge in Western societies, indigenous peoples and local
84. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
85. Id. at 481.
86. See Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV.
1421, 1465 (2009); Fromer, supra note 25, at 560–62; Lemley, supra note 30, at 1499–1500; John M.
Olin, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2007, 2024
(2005); Dan Callaway, Note, Patent Incentives in the Semiconductor Industry, 4 HASTINGS BUS. L.J.
135, 143–44 (2008).
87. See generally Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Pierson, Peer Review, and Patent Law, 69 VAND.
L. REV. 1825, 1828 (2016).
88. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1155, 1163–64 (2002); Ben Klemens, The Rise of the Information Processing Patent, 14
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 35 (2008) (finding that software and IT related patents are “virtually useless
for disclosure purposes”); Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 2083, 2127–28 (2009).
89. Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 86, at 1499–1500; Wagner, supra note 29.
90. See infra Section III.A.1 on information-forcing rules in patent law.
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communities predominantly use oral traditions to conserve and transfer
knowledge.91 In the rare cases where TK resources are codified, they tend
to be codified in local languages that may not be understood by patent
examiners. Therefore, the unique features of TK that make it inaccessible
increase the information asymmetry between an inventor who managed to
gain access to TK and a patent examiner working to decide the patentability of the claimed invention. The following Sections outline the issues that
arise and problems that must be addressed when modern industries rely on
TK resources in their inventive process.
A. The Value & Loss of TK Resources92
The relationship between the requirement and the use of TK resources can be explained through the example of modern drug discovery
and development. Although the example of TK use in the biopharmaceutical field is used as an example throughout this Article, one can imagine
the multiple areas of modern research and development that could benefit
from the use of TK.93
It is no secret that research and development takes considerable time
and resources in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical (hereafter biopharmaceutical) industries. For instance, by one estimate, the out-of-pocket
preapproval cost of the development of a drug to the point of marketing is
around $802 million.94 And the average time from human testing to
post-regulatory approval is estimated to be over nine years.95 One approach that biopharmaceutical firms have adopted to reduce this cost is
“ethnopharmacology” or “ethnomedicine,” which is the use of TK in the

91. Gebru, supra note 22, at 300.
92. TK resources may be useful in two ways. The resources are used by indigenous peoples and
local communities as they have been used for centuries, for example for traditional healthcare, agricultural management, and environmental conservation. Another way TK resources are useful is as an
input in modern industries. This Section focuses on this second type of use because of its relevance
for the requirement. This, however, is not meant to discount the independent use of that TK resources
have for the source community. The independent use of TK resources has been essential for the survival of indigenous peoples and local communities. For instance, the World Health Organization has
stated that 70–80% of the population in developing countries relies on the independent use of traditional medicine and substantial portions of the population in developed countries rely on some form
of alternative medicine. See Xiaorui Zhang, Traditional Medicine: Its Importance and Protection, in
U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., PROTECTING AND PROMOTING TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: SYSTEMS,
NATIONAL EXPERIENCES AND INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS, at 3, 3 U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/DITC/TED/10 (2004).
93. For instance, research into agriculture and environmental protection have considerably benefitted from the knowledge and resources of indigenous peoples and local communities. See generally
INT’L PROGRAM ON TRADITIONAL ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE & INT’L DEV. RESEARCH CTR.,
TRADITIONAL ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE: CONCEPTS AND CASES 1, 15 (Julian T. Inglis ed., 1993).
94. Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronals W. Hansen & Henery G. Grabowski, The Price of Innovation:
New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 166 (2003) (This data is from
the year 2000 and with annual inflation at 2.4% since 2000, the current cost of an average drug would
therefore be over $1.1 billion).
95. KI Kaitin, Deconstructing the Drug Development Process: The New Face of Innovation, 87
CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 356, 358 (2010).
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search of resources with medicinal value.96 Empirical research has proved
that ethnopharmacology has reduced the time and cost of developing biopharmaceutical products.97 One of the key benefits of using TK resources
is in increasing the efficiency of initial screening of biodiversity candidates for further examination. For instance, in one study, the chances of
getting a preliminary hit98 in plant screening increased from 6% without
the use of TK to 25% with the use of TK.99 Additional research indicated
that the use of TK increased the efficiency of screening plants in the development of a cure for HIV/AIDS.100 While some claims of traditional
medicines have had questionable efficacy,101 the empirical evidence points
to the significant potential that TK resources have as an input for modern
industries. The trial and error from the centuries-old use of biodiversity
resources by communities has been serving as a diverse pool upon which
biopharmaceutical firms build to develop modern drugs.
Despite the value of biodiversity and TK resources, they increasingly
face an alarming rate of loss.102 Conservationists have been warning of the
high rate of biodiversity loss since the later decades of the twentieth century.103 Caused by human activity such as changes in land use, pollution,
96. See generally Gordon C. Rausser & Arthur A. Small, Valuing Research Leads: Bioprospecting and the Conservation of Genetic Resources, 108 J. POL. ECON. 173, 178 (2000) (“Indeed,
some firms base their entire product discovery programs on leveraging the experience of traditional
healers concerning the therapeutic properties of plants used in herbal medicine.”).
97. Daniel S. Fabricant & Norman R. Farnsworth, The Value of Plants Used in Traditional
Medicine for Drug Discovery, 109 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 69, 69 (Supp. 2001); Axel Helmstadter &
Christiane Staiger, Traditional Use of Medicinal Agents: A Valid Source of Evidence, 19 DRUG
DISCOVERY TODAY 4, 4 (2014); P.J. Houghton, The Role of Plants in Traditional Medicine and Current Therapy, 1 J. ALTERNATIVE COMPLEMENTARY MED. 131, 136 (1995); M.L. Willcox et al., A
“Reverse Pharmacology” Approach for Developing an Anti-Malarial Phytomedicine, MALARIA J.,
Mar. 2011, at 1.
98. Rebecca Deprez-Poulain & Benoit Deprez, Facts, Figures and Trends in Lead Generation,
4 CURRENT TOPICS IN MED. CHEMISTRY 569, 580 (2004); Benoit Deprez & Rebecca Deprez-Poulain,
Hit-to-Lead: Driving Forces for the Medicinal Chemist, 4 CURRENT TOPICS IN MED. CHEMISTRY I, at
i (2004).
99. Cf. C. Haris Saslis-Lagoudakis et al., Phylogenies Reveal Predictive Power of Traditional
Medicine in Bioprospecting, 109 PNAS 15835, 15835 (2012).
100. Daniel Goleman, Shamans and Their Lore May Vanish with Forests, N.Y. TIMES (June 11,
1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/06/11/science/shamans-and-their-lore-may-vanish-with-forests.html (“In a field study in the rain forest in Belize, Dr. [Michael] Balick [director of the Institute
of Economic Botany at the New York Botanical Garden] compared using a random collection of plant
species with an ethnobotanical approach, in which only the plants that local people say have medical
uses are collected. . . . Of the 20 plants collected on the shaman’s advice, five killed the AIDS virus
but spared the T cells. But of 18 plant species gathered randomly, just one did so.”).
101. The term “traditional medicine” is at times conflated with questionable medical practices
such as voodoo medicine, the efficacy of which has not been proved scientifically. The World Health
Organization, for instance, has noted the problem and is working to ensure that traditional medicine
continues to be practiced safely. WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO TRADITIONAL MEDICINE STRATEGY
2014–2023, at 12 (2013).
102. Paul R. Ehrlich, The Loss of Diversity: Causes and Consequences, in BIODIVERSITY 21,
21–22 (E.O. Wilson & Frances M. Peter eds., 1988).
103. Timothy R. Tomlinson, Preface to MEDICINAL PLANTS: THEIR ROLE IN HEALTH AND
BIODIVERSITY, at ix, ix–xi (Timothy R. Tomlinson & Olayiwola Akerele eds., 1998); Luis Maffi,
Linguistic and Biological Diversity: The Inextricable Link, 29 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 599, 601
(2005) (discussing the high rate of cultural and linguistic loss that impacts the knowledge of the uses
of biodiversity).
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climate change, and invasion of invasive species, the loss of biodiversity
has been estimated to be 100–1000 times the rate it would be without human interference.104 For example, the normal rate of biodiversity loss used
to be in the range of “1–10 species per million per year,” but in recent
years that number has risen to “hundreds or low thousands per million per
year.”105 Researchers have calculated the annual loss from ecosystem services to be around $250 billion.106 To save this valuable resource from
disappearing, world leaders worked towards the signing of the Convention
on Biological Diversity in 1992.107 Two of the key contributions of the
Convention to our current purposes were: (1) the recognition that source
countries have sovereign rights in their biodiversity resources;108 and (2)
the recognition that indigenous peoples and local communities should equitably benefit from the innovations arising out of TK resources.109
In addition to the inherent harm caused by the loss of biodiversity,
this alarming rate of loss impacts the sustainability of innovation in the
bioprospecting industry. Because only a small portion of the world’s biodiversity has been scientifically studied,110 the high rate of loss means inventors (and by implication, the public) miss out on the development of
products with potential to enhance welfare.
B. A Rising Protectionist Trend
One of the key contributions of this Article is to highight a rising
protectionist trend that should worry anyone interested in encouraging
innovation in industries that rely on TK resources. The protectionist trend
is one in which source communities and countries rich in TK resources are
increasingly introducing barriers to access to these resources. While the
tendency to keep TK secret because of fears of biopiracy have been mentioned in other publications,111 these references tend to be made only in

104. See V. H. HEYWOOD, UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY
ASSESSMENT 5 (1995); see also MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, LIVING BEYOND OUR
MEANS: NATURAL ASSETS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING 1, 3 (2005). For research on the human contribution to biodiversity loss, see Deborah J. Forester & Gary E. Machlis, Modeling Human Factors that
Affect the Loss of Biodiversity, 10 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1253, 1253 (1996).
105. PETRA EBERMANN, PATENTS AS PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE? A
LAW AND ECONOMICS APPROACH 26 (2012).
106. MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING (2005).
107. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 21, at 1–2.
108. Id. at 1.
109. Id.
110. See Mark J. Costello, Biodiversity: The Known, Unknown, and Rates of Extinction, 25
CURRENT BIOLOGY R368, R368 (2015). National Geographic has discussed the possibility of an overwhelming majority of species still being unknown. See Traci Watson, 86 Percent of Earth’s Species
Still Unknown?, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS (Aug. 25, 2011), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2011/08/110824-earths-species-8-7-million-biology-planet-animals-science.
111. See, e.g., Nuno Pires De Carvalho, From the Shaman’s Hut to the Patent Office: A Road
Under Construction, in BIODIVERSITY AND THE LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, BIOTECHNOLOGY
AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 241, 245–46 (Charles R. McManis ed., 2007).
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passing. This Article makes the case that there is a strong and rising protectionist trend among source communities that policy makers should seriously consider.
Biodiversity resources are unevenly distributed throughout the world.
Countries in the Global South112 are home to a high percentage of biodiversity resources. For instance, megadiverse countries113—the top seventeen biodiversity-rich countries in the world—hold between 60–80% of
the world’s flora and fauna.114 Only two of the seventeen megadiverse
countries—the United States and Australia—are economically developed
countries. On the other hand, the capacity to exploit these resources on a
commercial scale is concentrated in the Global North. This uneven distribution of resources, coupled with the lack of legal protection for TK resources and the absence of research and business practices that recognize
the contribution of source communities, create what many consider to be
an unfair relationship. This is one of the major concerns that led to the
convening, and later signature, of the Convention on Biological Diversity.115
While the signing of the Convention was a major milestone to conserve biodiversity and ensure benefit sharing, the implementation of the
Convention was far from what source communities and countries hoped
for. This legal lacuna and many high-profile cases of biopiracy116 have
forced many source communities and jurisdictions to create barriers to access to TK resources. While the Convention’s mission was to facilitate
access to TK resources in exchange for benefit sharing, its failure seems
to have encouraged quite the opposite. As one scholar noted:
[T]he [Convention on Biodiversity] has . . . stimulated a wave of national legislation having the effect (whether intended or unintended)
of restricting, rather than facilitating, access to genetic resources in the
developing world, pending the industrialized world’s adoption of a
meaningful benefit-sharing measures.117

112. The term “Global South” is a rough reference to developing countries which are concentrated south of the equator. Nour Dados & Raewyn Connell, The Global South, CONTEXTS, Winter
2012, at 12, 12 (“The phrase ‘Global South’ refers broadly to the regions of Latin America, Asia,
Africa, and Oceania. It is one of a family of terms, including ‘Third World’ and ‘Periphery,’ that
denote regions outside Europe and North America, mostly (though not all) low-income and often politically or culturally marginalized.”).
113. The term “megadiverse countries” refers to the top biodiversity rich countries in the world,
which hold a minimum of five thousand endemic plant species and a marine ecosystem within their
borders. See, e.g., Areas of Biodiversity Importance: Megadiverse Countries, BIODIVERSITY A–Z,
http://www.biodiversitya-z.org/content/megadiverse-countries (last visited Mar. 14, 2019).
114. RUSSELL A. MITTERMEIER & CRISTINA GOETTSCH MITTERMEIER, MEGADIVERSITY:
EARTH’S BIOLOGICALLY WEALTHIEST NATIONS 18 (2005).
115. THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY: FROM CONCEPTION TO IMPLEMENTATION
1, 4–5 (2004), https://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/CBD-10th-anniversary.pdf.
116. ROBINSON, supra note 20.
117. McManis, supra note 41, at 5.
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The Convention was signed because member countries understood
that access to biodiversity resources was necessary for innovation in certain fields. Thus, evidence of a rising protectionist trend should worry policy makers tasked with encouraging the “[p]rogress of . . . useful arts.”118
The rise in protectionist trend can be observed in at least two features
of domestic legal activity. The first is the increasing number of new legislation creating barriers to access to TK, or the amendment of existing legislation (including intellectual property (IP)119 laws) to include TK protection.120 Several of the major biodiversity hotspots of the world have enacted domestic legislation with the effect of restricting access to TK.121
For instance, in June 2018, the second biggest megadiverse country, Indonesia, strengthened its laws to protect its biodiversity from biopirates.122
While legislation governing TK resources may be crafted to facilitate access, because most are reacting to allegations of biopiracy, they do not
seem to meet the right balance between access and restriction.
The second feature that signals a rising protectionist trend is the creation of restricted TK databases or registers. While the practice of documenting TK in databases is still new, many of the jurisdictions that have
decided to invest in these databases seem to have adopted highly restrictive measures. For instance, the pioneering TK database is the Indian government’s Traditional Knowledge Digital Library (TKDL), which boasts
the codification of over 250,000 medical formulations from Indian traditional medicinal knowledge.123 While those who manage the TKDL claim
the database is accessible due to the translation of its contents into five of
the leading international languages, access to the database is granted only
to patent examiners for the sole purpose of patent examination.124 Patent
118. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
119. The term “intellectual property” is generally used to refer to the rights granted over scientific, literary, and artistic creations that meet a set of requirements under the law. The three core types
of intellectual property rights are patents, copyrights, and trademarks. See What Is Intellectual Property?, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., https://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en (last visited Mar. 22, 2019).
120. A search for TK-related legislation on the WIPO legal text database results in 173 records.
Almost all of these legislations were enacted after the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and
the overwhelming majority are among countries of the Global South. Some of these legislations cover
several issues including TK, traditional cultural expression, and genetic resources. WIPO LEX
SEARCH, https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/legislation/results?subjectMatters=18 (last visited Mar. 22,
2019).
121. Carvalho, supra note 111, at 245–46; Thomas Cottier & Marion Panizzon, Legal Perspectives on Traditional Knowledge: The Case for Intellectual Property Protection, in INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
REGIME 565, 565–94 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005) (outlining national legislations enacted to protect TK in India, Brazil, Peru, the Philippines, and the Africa model legislation).
122. Harish Mehta, Indonesia Strengthens Laws Against Biopirates, BUS. TIMES (June 8, 2018,
5:50 AM), https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/opinion/indonesia-strengthens-laws-against-biopirates.
123. See
About
TKDL,
TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE
DIGITAL
LIBR.,
http://www.tkdl.res.in/tkdl/langdefault/common/Abouttkdl.asp?GL=Eng (last visited Mar. 22, 2019).
124. By granting access to several patent offices around the world, including the PTO, the TKDL
has already been credited for the revocation, suspension, or amendment of 206 patents in multiple
jurisdictions. Additionally, the Indian government has submitted challenges against over 1,200 patent
applications. See id.
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offices interested in gaining access to the database have to sign a nondisclosure agreement after negotiating the specific terms with the Indian government.125 Other countries are adopting this practice of making TK databases restrictive.126
Policy makers should be concerned that, instead of increased access
that spurs improvements, researchers now face restrictions. Because the
ultimate result of a research project is usually unpredictable, researchers
need access to a wide range of input, including TK. If states with huge
biodiversity resources continue adopting a restrictive stance, it is easy to
imagine how such a trend could affect research in industries that benefit
from TK, including the biopharmaceutical sector. Even if researchers find
a way around restrictions, legislation, and TK registries, the increase in
transaction costs of accessing these resources creates inefficiencies.
The move towards protectionism is even more troubling because
most source communities do not have the capacity to independently develop TK into modern products. For instance, if source communities could
develop their traditional medicinal knowledge into a drug that could be
marketed globally, then the restrictions would function in the same way
trade secrets help firms develop products while keeping commercially valuable information hidden.127 However, the overwhelming majority of
source communities and many megadiverse countries lack the financial
and human resource capacity to develop TK resources into commercial
products. Furthermore, there are multiple reports sounding the alarm on
the very high rate of biodiversity loss,128 and TK resources rely heavily on
biodiversity. Protectionism, in the face of such a high rate of resource loss,
125. See Traditional Knowledge Digital Library (TKDL) Access Agreement, TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE DIGITAL LIBR., http://www.tkdl.res.in/tkdl/langdefault/common/terms.pdf (last visited
Mar. 22, 2019).
126. REPUBLIC OF S. AFR. DEP’T OF SCIENCE & TECH., THE NATIONAL RECORDAL SYSTEM:
PRESENTED TO THE NATIONAL BIODIVERSITY INITIATIVE 8, 17 (2013), http://www.abs-initiative.info/uploads/media/Carol_van_Wyk___Tom_Suchanandan_-_DST__National_Recordal_System.pdf; Bandile Sikwane, National Recordal System: Safeguarding the Future of Indigenous Knowledge Through ICT, CSIR SCI. SCOPE 60, 60–61 (2015); Korean Intellectual
Property Office, Introduction of Korean Traditional Knowledge Portal (KTKP), WORLD INTELL.
PROP.
ORG.
(2011),
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_tkdl_del_11/wipo_tkdl_del_11_ref_t9_4.pdf;
KTKP Introduction, KTKP, http://www.koreantk.com/en/m_about/about_01.jsp?about=1 (last visited
Mar. 22, 2019); Song Jiangxiu, State Intellectual Prop. Office of the People’s Republic of China, Introduction of China Traditional Chinese Medicine Patent Database, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.
(Dec.
16–17,
2009),
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_iptk_bkk_09/wipo_iptk_bkk_09_topic5_2.pdf.
127. Doris Estelle Long, Trade Secrets and Traditional Knowledge: Strengthening International
Protection of Indigenous Innovation, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK
OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 495, 536 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2011)
(suggesting the extension of trade secrecy protection for TK ).
128. See generally BIODIVERSITY LOSS: ECONOMIC AND ECOLOGICAL ISSUES (Charles Perrings
et al. eds., 1997); Ben A. Minteer, Valuing Nature, in LOSS OF BIODIVERSITY 75, 86 (Sharon L. Spray
& Karen L. McGlothlin eds., 2003); THE ROOT CAUSES OF BIODIVERSITY LOSS 9 (Alexander Wood
et al. eds., 2000); Stuart L. Pimm et al., The Future of Biodiversity, 269 SCIENCE 347, 347–50 (1995);
John G. Robinson, The Limits to Caring: Sustainable Living and the Loss of Biodiversity, 7
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 20, 25 (1993).
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will result in numerous TK resources disappearing for eternity before being examined for their bioprospecting potential. In other words, a protectionist stance, coupled with the lack of capacity in source communities to
independently commercialize TK, results in the underutilization of this
valuable resource.129 This is undesirable from the perspective of global social welfare because increased access to research input is expected to encourage innovation, not increased restrictions.130
Ultimately, a rising protectionist trend means that the status quo in
which firms use TK resources to develop products is unsustainable in the
long run. Because of this protectionist trend, researchers and firms that
have the means to commercialize TK resources will be unable to access
the resources (or may face high transaction costs), and their bioprospecting
effort will be curtailed. The unfortunate results will be that the public will
miss out on innovative products, firms in the field will see the costs of
doing research rise because of high transaction costs, and source communities will miss out on a share of the profits that they would have received
had their TK resources been used to develop products. The increasing
number of restrictions created by several jurisdictions show that this worrisome protectionist trend is on the rise.
III. ADDRESSING DISCLOSURE IN THE TK CONTEXT
A major contribution of the Article is using a welfareist perspective
to justify introducing the requirement in U.S. patent law. The requirement
would lead to welfare-enhancing outcomes instead of the inefficient and
unsustainable status quo where researchers face a rising protectionist trend
or where the PTO grants patent rights to undeserving applicants. Amending U.S. law to introduce the requirement is justified based on the twin
goals of improving patent quality and reversing a rising protectionist trend.
While some version of the requirement has been discussed internationally,131 a robust discussion of the costs and benefits of introducing the
requirement in domestic U.S. law is lacking. The next two Sections turn
to the normative case for explicitly introducing the requirement into U.S.
129. DARRELL A. POSEY & GRAHAM DUTFIELD, BEYOND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: TOWARD
TRADITIONAL RESOURCE RIGHTS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES 1–2 (1996).
130. The core purpose of the CBD is to create increased access to TK resources so that researchers can use the resources for further innovation. See Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note
21, at 1–2.
131. CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ISSUES
AND OPTIONS SURROUNDING THE PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 19 (2001); IKECHI
MGBEOJI, GLOBAL BIOPIRACY: PATENTS, PLANTS, AND INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE 174 (2005); Peter
Drahos & Susy Frankel, Indigenous Peoples’ Innovation and Intellectual Property: Time Issues, in
INDIGENOUS PEOPLE’S INNOVATION: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PATHWAYS TO DEVELOPMENT 1, 26
(Peter Drahos & Susy Frankel eds., 2012); OGUAMANAM, supra note 23; Joshua D. Sarnoff & Carlos
M. Correa, U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., Analysis of Options for Implementing Disclosure of Origin
Requirements in Intellectual Property Applications, at iii, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DITC/TED/2004/14
(2006); Nuno Pires De Carvalho, From the Shaman’s Hut to the Patent Office: In Search of a TRIPSConsistent Requirement to Disclose the Origin of Genetic Resources and Prior Informed Consent, 17
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 111, 184 (2005).
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patent law. The stated goal of the U.S. patent system is to encourage “the
progress of . . . useful arts.”132 The rest of the Article argues that the introduction of a carefully calibrated and explicit requirement to disclose the
source of TK used in inventive processes would be consistent with this
goal.
A. Information-Forcing Rules
This Section makes the normative case for the introduction of an explicit requirement that would compel patent applicants to disclose the
source of TK they used in their application. It also outlines the value of
conceiving the requirement as an information-forcing rule. The requirement should be designed as an information-forcing rule that can elicit socially beneficial information from the least-cost providers (i.e., patent applicants). Conceiving the requirement in this way reveals that it will improve patent quality and reduce costs in the patent system without unduly
burdening researchers. This Article posits that the cost-benefit analysis of
introducing the requirement should be reconsidered through the lens of an
information-forcing rule.
While information-forcing rules have been examined in many contexts, the first strong case for the adoption of such rules was made in the
contracts context.133 In their seminal article discussing information-forcing rules,134 Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner identify two types of scenarios
in the context of contracts that would benefit from the adoption of defaultpenalty rules. One scenario is in which parties facing significant transaction cost ex ante create contractual gaps with the intention of having the
gaps filled with an ex post court interpretation based on the standard of
“what the parties would have wanted.”135 The parties avoid adding a contractual term because the ex ante cost is higher than the ex post cost of
having a court interpret the contract. The cost of interpreting the contractual term is, therefore, an externality born by publicly supported courts.
The second type of scenario that Ayres and Gertner identify is one in
which a party with private information creates a contractual gap by withholding privately held information that, if revealed, would result in a socially optimal outcome.136 The well-informed party withholds the information because, even if the disclosure of information would increase the
pie, the party’s portion of the pie will be smaller than if the party kept the
information private. In this second scenario, default rules can be designed
to force the well-informed party to reveal the privately held information
and thereby enable a socially beneficial deal to take place. In a sense, the

132.
133.
at 1, 3.
134.
135.
136.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Alex Reinert, Pleading as Information-Forcing, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2012,
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 91.
Id. at 92–93.
Id. at 94.
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default rules function against a strategic, rent-seeking behavior that a
well-informed party may take in a contract negotiation.
This second type of relationship may be observed in the employment
contract sense. While the default employment contract in the United States
is “at will,” most employees erroneously believe that they cannot be fired
from their jobs without “just cause.”137 Sophisticated employers who usually draft a boilerplate employment contract can be expected to know the
“at will” nature of their employment relationship with their employees. By
concealing the “at will” nature of an employment contract, an employer
may benefit from the false sense of job security that its employee may
have, while being able to terminate any individual without cause. Courts
and legislators can (and do in some circumstances) adopt a default rule
that the employment contract will be presumed to be a “just cause” employment unless the employer explicitly communicates the “at will” nature
of employment to their potential employees. Adopting such a default rule
will ensure that the well-informed party (the employer) discloses the privately held information (the “at will” nature of employment) to the employee, thereby ensuring a real meeting of the minds when the parties enter
into an employment contract. The adoption of information-forcing default
rules in these contexts, therefore, serves the core purpose of contract law:
ensuring that there is a meeting of the minds between parties to the contract.
Several other doctrines of contract law could be described as information-forcing (or information-eliciting) default rules. The rule that vague
terms in contracts will be construed against the drafting party,138 and the
presumption, in the Statute of Frauds, that parties do not intend to have a
legally enforceable agreement unless it is made in writing, can be
understood as a default-penalty rule.139 Information-forcing rules have
been identified in other areas of law including constitutional law, employment law, legal ethics, the law of corporations, environmental law, arbitration, and criminal law.140

137. J. H. Verkerke, Legal Ignorance and Information-Forcing Rules, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV.
899, 923 (2015); Rachel Leiser Levy, Comment, Judicial Interpretation of Employee Handbooks: The
Creation of a Common Law Information-Eliciting Penalty Default Rule, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 695, 695
(2005).
138. David M. Driesen & Shubha Gosh, The Functions of Transaction Costs: Rethinking Transaction Cost Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 61, 72 (2005).
139. Shawn Pompian, Note, Is the Statute of Frauds Ready for Electronic Contracting?, 85 VA.
L. REV. 1447, 1453 (1999).
140. For an extensive list of different areas in which information-forcing rules have been identified and analyzed, see Ian Ayres, Ya-Huh: There Are and Should Be Penalty Defaults, 33 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 589, 601–11 (2006); see, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-Forcing Environmental
Regulation, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 861, 861 (2005); Reinert, supra note 133.
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1. Information-Forcing Rules in Patent Law
IP law scholars have embraced the information-forcing rule’s literature as a helpful lens to examine various doctrines.141 This is even more so
the case in the patent law field.142 The predominance of a utilitarian justification for patent law lends itself to an incentive-based analysis. More
importantly, the various doctrines in patent law seem to have been designed to force patent applicants to disclose as much information as possible. The information-forcing default rules literature is especially well
placed as a useful analytic tool in patent law because of the unique dynamics involved between the different “parties”—patent applicants, patent examiners, courts, competitors, and the public. Patent applicants (inventors)
are usually the leading experts in the particular field of scientific inquiry
to which their invention belongs and, as a result, they tend to have the most
relevant information about their invention. Although patent examiners
have a scientific background, they cannot be expected to have expert
knowledge of every invention they examine. Furthermore, patent applicants have the incentive to withhold information from patent examiners,
their competitors, and the public. Disclosing relevant information about
prior art may limit the scope of their patent claims, and the more information inventors reveal about their invention, the more they may be giving
up their competitive advantage. The fact that patent claims are drafted by
patent applicants and that the scope of the exclusive patent right is based
on the amount of information disclosed gives patent applicants “the motive
and the opportunity” to withhold information from the patent examiner.143
More importantly, for our current context, the various rules compelling patent applicants to disclose information about the claimed invention
have information-forcing qualities.144 The relationship in patent law is
generally described as a “social contract” between the inventor and the
141. Mary De Ming Fan, Governing Copyright in Cyberspace: The Penalty Default Problem
with State-Centric Sovereignty, 43 JURIMETRICS J. 315, 317 (2003) (highlighting an international copyright treaty’s creation of a nonenforcement default for digitally transmitted material in signatory
states that would benefit from such protection); Catherine L. Fisk, Authors at Work: The Origins of
the Work-for-Hire Doctrine, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 54–55 (2003) (describing the holding in Boucicault v. Fox, 3 F. Cas. 977 (S.D.N.Y. 1862), as a penalty default encouraging employers who want
to own the copyright resulting from the work of their employees to contract expressly); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1889, 1962
n.305 (2002) (noting the 1991 European Union Software Directive as setting a penalty default of interoperability encouraging copyright owners to make interface information “readily available”); Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 556 (2004) (comparing default
licenses in copyright to “penalty defaults”).
142. Robert P. Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
1, 36–37 (1999) (describing rules granting patent ownership to consultants as a way of forcing employers to disclose information about the complementarity of the consultant’s invention to the employer’s assets); Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 33, at 159–60 (describing the “inequitable conduct” as an
information-forcing rule designed to discourage patent applicants from engaging in strategic behavior); Wagner, supra note 29, at 221 (positing that prosecution history estoppel should be conceived of
as an information-forcing default rule).
143. Wagner, supra note 29, at 215.
144. Fromer, supra 25, at 560–62.
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public. The inventor shares useful information about a new and nonobvious invention—information that could otherwise be kept a secret145—in
exchange for a limited monopoly right to exclude anyone from making,
using, or selling the claimed invention. The validity and scope of a patent
claim are directly related to the information disclosed in the patent application. A patent applicant can act strategically by withholding relevant information and applying for the broadest patent scope feasible. If the patent
examiner misses the relevant prior art reference and grants a patent right
with broad claims, the patent applicant could have her cake and eat it too—
she can keep the most useful information secret while being able to use the
broad patent right to exclude competitors from making, using, or selling
products and services embodying the claimed invention.
However, as outlined in Part I,146 patent law has devised several tools
to guard against these types of strategic behaviors by patent applicants.
The many forms of the disclosure requirement—enablement, written description, definiteness, and “best mode”147—compel patent applicants to
disclose information relevant for patent scope or validity. Failure to comply with these requirements would result in the rejection of a patent application or the invalidation and unenforceability of granted patents. These
rules have the quality of information-forcing rules in that they elicit information from the well-informed party for the benefit of a less informed
party (patent examiner) or third party (a competitor, or the public). In this
way, patent prosecution could be described as a negotiation between the
patent applicant and the patent examiner.148
Scholars have described other patent law doctrines as information-forcing default rules. For instance, the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel, which restricts patent applicants from extending the scope
of their claim during enforcement to areas that were abandoned during patent prosecution (negotiation), has been described as an information-forcing rule.149 Patent applicants have a choice to make before applying for a
patent and during patent prosecution. They can claim broadly and take a
risk that the patent examiner may ask them to amend their claim, which
means the amendment becomes part of the prosecution history, and thus
the patent applicant is blocked from claiming the abandoned scope through
the doctrine of equivalents.150 Alternatively, in anticipation of prosecution
history estoppel, the applicant can submit a narrow claim that truly reflects
the scope of the invention in the original application to avoid creating
amendments that could be used against the applicant at a later stage.151 In
145. See, e.g., James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, Expropriation and Inventions: Appropriable
Rents in the Absence of Property Rights, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 190, 204 (1994).
146. See infra Section I.A.
147. 35 U.S.C. § 11(a)–(b) (2018).
148. Wagner, supra note 29, at 216 n.194; see infra Section III.A.2.b.
149. Wagner, supra note 29, at 211–21.
150. Id. at 215–16.
151. Id. at 217.
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this sense, prosecution history estoppel functions as an information-forcing rule that patent applicants can avoid by providing a more honest disclosure than they would have provided in the absence of such a requirement.152
As discussed earlier,153 patent applicants have a duty of candor and
good faith in dealing with the PTO. One of the main channels through
which this duty is enforced is the inequitable conduct defense.154 Defendants accused of patent infringement can point to inequitable conduct that
the patentee engaged in during the patent application process, and if the
defense is successful, all the claims in the patent application will be unenforceable.155 As the Federal Circuit put it, “the remedy for inequitable
conduct is the ‘atomic bomb’ of patent law. Unlike validity defenses,
which are claim specific . . . inequitable conduct regarding any single
claim renders the entire patent unenforceable.”156 The inequitable conduct
defense is designed to protect the integrity of the patent system by tapping
into the power of private actors to investigate inequitable conduct.157
The inequitable conduct defense is also another instance where patent
law adopts a default-penalty rule that seeks to compel patent applicants to
disclose useful information.158 As highlighted in the preceding paragraphs,
patent applicants have both the incentive to withhold information damaging to the scope of their patent and the expectation that patent examiners
might not notice the lack of full disclosure, thereby granting them a
broader patent right than is justified. While minimal disclosure is tempting
for patent applicants, the potential risk of their whole patent becoming unenforceable because of inequitable conduct creates a huge incentive to provide full disclosure.159 Applicants can avoid this penalty by honestly
providing all material information to the PTO.160 In this sense, the inequitable conduct doctrine functions as an information-eliciting default rule.
In a general sense, both prosecution history estoppel and inequitable conduct rules are designed to ensure that patentees fulfill the part of the deal
in the “social contract” they enter into with the public, which is the disclosure of all material information about the claimed invention.
2. The Requirement as Information Forcing
The requirement that patent applicants disclose TK resources used in
their inventive process should be conceived of as an information-forcing
152. Id.
153. See supra Section I.A.
154. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2018).
155. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (internal
citations omitted).
156. Id.
157. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 74, at 977.
158. Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 33, at 159–60.
159. Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 668 (2002).
160. Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 33, at 160.
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rule compelling a patent applicant to divulge socially beneficial information. Although the concept of requiring patent applicants to disclose the
source of TK has been discussed in scholarship and in international negotiations, this Article is the first to provide a detailed examination of the
requirement as an information-forcing rule.
To make the case for the conception of the requirement as an information-forcing rule, it seems necessary to look at the dynamics between
the parties involved and the effect the rule would have on these parties. As
outlined by Ayres and Gertner,161 and other scholars who have examined
the concept subsequently, information-forcing rules are best applied to
scenarios involving: (1) a well-informed party; (2) who, based on information asymmetry; (3) behaves strategically; (4) to block a socially beneficial outcome from being realized. This Section will follow the same
structure to make the case for the conception of the requirement as an information-forcing rule.
a. The Well-Informed Party
A useful grouping of the different parties within the universe of patent applications involves the patent applicant, the examiner, competitors,
courts, and the public. Of these groups of participants, patent applicants
are the most well-informed. Here, the term “patent applicant” refers to the
group of people, including the inventor and patent attorney, involved in
preparing the patent application. Considering a scenario in which a new
and nonobvious invention is being claimed, the person who came up with
the invention—the inventor—by definition, has the most relevant expertise regarding the claimed invention.162 One can imagine the considerable
time, energy, and expertise needed to develop a patentable invention. If
other participants had the same level of information, they would have
rushed to the PTO to apply for a patent right. Patent attorneys who work
with the inventor and are hired to conduct prior art searches as part of the
patent application will also have the most relevant information about the
claimed invention.
The other participants in the patent universe tend to have less information than patent applicants. Patent examiners have scientific training
and are expected to independently conduct prior art searches to decide
whether the patent application is in fact valid. However, patent examiners
cannot be expected to develop the same level of expertise in their prior art
searches as an inventor who has developed an invention over time.163 Because the PTO is famously underfunded and patent examiners work under

161.
162.
163.

Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 91.
Wagner, supra note 29, at 212–13.
MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 74, at 729.
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tight schedules,164 one cannot expect examiners to spend the time and resources required to develop the same level of expertise as the inventor or
her attorney. In fact, the numbers show that the overwhelming amount of
granted patents are either amended or invalidated.165 The other participants
in the patent application process have even less chance of being exposed
to the most relevant information. Competitors of the patent applicant may
have some information about the claimed invention if they work in the
same field of research as the inventor. However, another fact that complicates the information provided in a patent application is that patent rights
protect more than what is stated in the claim.166 The doctrine of equivalents
expands the scope of patent rights to include activities considered to be
“equivalent” to an element claimed in a patent application.167 This expansive reading of claim language enables patent applicants to utilize vague
wording and other claim drafting strategies to distort the real scope of a
patent claim and increase the cost for observers of conducting a thorough
investigation.168 Even if competitors may at some point be able to gather
information comparable to the patent applicant, they would have to spend
significant resources to do so. Ultimately, the patent applicant is the leastcost provider of the most relevant information about the claimed invention.
b. Information Asymmetry
It is commonly accepted that there is significant information asymmetry in patent prosecution.169 The ex parte nature of patent prosecution
means that the patent applicant and examiner are the two key players at
the heart of the process, and because of the dynamics outlined above, patent applicants tend to have more information about their invention than
patent examiners. The role of patent examiners is therefore to investigate
the credibility of the claims made by patent applicants based on the information submitted to the examiners and after searching for relevant prior
art.170 Although it is not conclusive, the large number of challenged patents
164. John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for
Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 314, 316 (2001) (discussing the PTO budget and patent
examiner dockets).
165. Jennifer Turchyn, Note, Improving Patent Quality Through Post-Grant Claim Amendment:
A Comparison of European Opposition Proceedings and U.S. Post-Grant Proceedings, 114 MICH. L.
REV. 1497, 1497 (2016) (highlighting, among other points, the increasing rate of patent invalidity
created by the AIA); Steve Brachmann & Gene Quinn, Are More Than 90 Percent of Patents Challenged at the PTAB Defective?, IP WATCHDOG (June 14, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/06/14/90-percent-patents-challenged-ptab-defective/id=84343.
166. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 606 (1950) (explaining the
doctrine of equivalents through which the scope of a patent covers infringing activity that is equivalent
to what is stated in the claims, even if it may not be literally identical to what is claimed).
167. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997).
168. Long, supra note 159, at 669.
169. Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 763, 763 (2002) (noting that the common knowledge that the PTO has knowledge deficiency
about the relevant prior art for claimed inventions, and suggesting multiple alternatives to address the
problem).
170. Long, supra note 159, at 667.
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being either amended or invalidated implies that information asymmetry
may have enabled the granting of a patent right for undeserving patent
applications.171 While some scholars have posited alternative measures of
addressing this information asymmetry,172 the majority of patent law
scholarship admits to the pervasiveness of unequal access to information.
The information asymmetry that is observed in the patent system is
even more pronounced in patent applications for inventions that rely on
TK resources. That is because inaccessibility of TK resources is one of the
main concerns regarding claims of biopiracy. Source communities that
provide TK resources tend to reside in remote regions of the world, their
TK is predominantly transmitted through oral traditions,173 and much of
the codified knowledge is documented in inaccessible databases.174 It is
revealing that many of the alleged acts of biopiracy are based on TK resources that are well-known among members of the source community.175
In the examples cited earlier, information asymmetry between the researchers (patent applicants) and the patent examiners is to blame for the
granting of patent rights for the process of using turmeric powder to heal
surgical wounds or over neem tree extracts used as pesticides when generations of Indians have used the same plant extracts for the same purpose.176
c. Strategic Behavior
The information asymmetry between the well-informed party (the patent applicant) and the patent examiner gives applicants considerable incentive and opportunity to act strategically by withholding the use of TK
resources in their inventive process.177 Although patent applicants must
171. Id. at 663.
172. For instance, Mark Lemley has argued that patent applicants face high costs of conducting
prior art searches. He therefore suggests that competitors should be encouraged to conduct these
searches since they will only choose to challenge valuable patents and decide to selectively conduct
prior art searches. See Lemley, supra note 30, at 1510. While Professor Lemley’s analysis does make
sense if the policy question is who should conduct prior art searches, patent applicants are still the best
low-cost providers of information in their possession—information that was used to develop the
claimed invention. Because, in the current contexts, the information required of patent applicants is
that which is already in their possession, eliciting such information from the patent applicant seems
more efficient than encouraging competitors to conduct searches ex post.
173. Gebru, supra note 22, at 327 (discussing the prevalence of oral transmission of TK and
suggesting legal intervention to encourage more codification).
174. The managers of the TKDL have worked to make the database accessible by, for instance,
translating the contents of the database into multiple major international languages and by developing
accessible classification methods. While this attempt is commendable, this level of accessibility is not
matched by the other major TK databases from other jurisdictions. About TKDL, supra note 123.
175. ROBINSON, supra note 20 (listing the major cases of biopiracy involving patent applications).
176. Sahdeo Prasad & Bharat B. Aggarwal, Turmeric, the Golden Spice: From Traditional Medicine to Modern Medicine, in HERBAL MEDICINE: BIOMOLECULAR AND CLINICAL ASPECTS 263, 263
(Iris F. F. Benzie & Sissi Wachtel-Galor eds., 2d ed. 2011).
177. Under the duty of candor and good faith, patent applicants are forbidden from withholding
information material for patentability, so the worry is not so much that patent applicants will outright
provide false information to the PTO. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2018). Because the duty of candor and good
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disclose information deemed to be material for the patentability examination,178 they are not required to conduct extensive prior art search outside
of what the inventor is exposed to during the inventive process; nor are
they required to provide context to their claimed invention.179 Therefore,
to get the broadest possible scope for their claims, patentees will only provide information the concealment of which would be a clear violation of
their duty of disclosure. It is true that patentees may be worried about their
patent being challenged by their competitors post-grant, but given that
only a fraction of granted patents are challenged,180 this risk is minimal. In
addition to being able to withhold information about the use of TK, patent
applicants can use overly vague terms so that they can claim to have met
their duty of disclosure if challenged at a later point. This practice of patent
applicants using vague terms to benefit from the resulting confusion is not
rare in patent practice,181 and it can be expected that patent applicants engaged in biopiracy could make use of this practice as well.
What is even more enabling of strategic behavior is that for centuries
TK resources have been considered to be raw materials for the inventive
process and part of the public domain—free for anyone to use.182 Thus, the
omission of information about TK use in a patent application may not be
seen as omission of material information. For example, Robert Larson,
who was granted a patent right over a “process for preparing a storage
stable neem seed extract,” knew of the benefits of the neem tree from the
time he spent in India.183 However, the list of cited references only includes two other patent applications unrelated to the neem tree and six
scientific articles that discuss various aspects of the benefits of the neem
tree.184 He only mentions India twice, and even then in a very general sense
to indicate that the tree grows in the country, among other places.185 The
fact that farmers in India have been using the neem tree extracts as pesticides—information that it is reasonable to expect he would have been
exposed to as an importer of timber from India—is not cited anywhere in
the granted patent or the document added during prosecution.186 Despite
the omission of what seems to be material information, the patent was
faith does not include a duty to conduct prior art searches, patent applicants could just claim that they
were unaware of the existence of TK resources.
178. Id.
179. Wagner, supra note 29, at 215.
180. Only about 1-2% of granted patents are litigated. See, e.g., Jason Rantanen, Patents, Litigation and Reexaminations, PATENTLY-O (Dec. 29, 2011), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2011/12/patents-litigation-and-reexaminations.html.
181. See generally Stephen J. Stark, Key Words and Tricky Phrases: An Analysis of Patent
Drafter’s Attempts to Circumvent the Language of 35 U.S.C. § 112, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 365, 366
(1997) (discussing the “gray language” used by patent applicants).
182. The protectionist trend outlined in earlier sections seems to have followed the recognition,
by the Convention on Biological Diversity, of some form of ownership over TK resources. See Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 21, at 1–2.
183. Stable Anti-Pest Neem Seed Extract, supra note 1; Shiva, supra note 2.
184. Stable Anti-Pest Neem Seed Extract, supra note 1.
185. Id. at Background of the Invention and Example I.
186. Certificate of Correction of U.S. Patent No. 4,556,562 (issued Dec. 3, 1985).
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granted and remained valid for the life of the patent, even though the European patent office invalidated an identical patent application after evidence of the use of neem tree extract by one Indian firm was submitted to
the office.187 Instead of being an example of an outlier case, the dynamics
between the various participants in the neem tree patent issue is representative of the relationship between patent applicants and examiners in other
cases in which biopiracy was alleged.188
What may further complicate the information asymmetry in the use
of TK is the confusion about the level of reliance required before patent
applicants would have to disclose their use of TK resources. The level of
reliance on TK resources could be put on a spectrum from minimal reliance as an inspiration to a maximum reliance in which the patent applicant
simply claims an element directly copied from TK or practice. It is not
clear where in this spectrum the reliance attains a level that triggers an
obligation to disclose TK use.189 Patent applicants can (and some do)190
use this confusion to their benefit by not disclosing TK use and claiming,
when challenged, that the TK or practice was only an inspiration. All these
opportunities to withhold information enable patent applicants to benefit
from the information asymmetry with minimal risk of patent invalidation.
d. Undesirable Outcome
The granting of patent rights for non-innovative or overly broad patent claims is an undesirable outcome, and this includes patent rights that
relied on TK resources without disclosing that fact. The PTO has been
criticized for granting patent rights to undeservingly broad claims, and the
problems associated with such practice have been stated by many patent
scholars.191 The monopolistic nature of patent rights is tolerated only because it is expected to provide incentives for inventors.192 If a patent right
187. See id.; Ulrike Hellerer & K.S. Jarayaman, Greens Persuade Europe to Revoke Patent on
Neem Tree, 405 NATURE INT’L J. SCI. 266, 266 (2000).
188. For a non-exhaustive list of cases of biopiracy and detailed discussion, see ROBINSON, supra note 20; see generally ABENA DOVE OSSEO-ASARE, BITTER ROOTS: THE SEARCH FOR HEALING
PLANTS IN AFRICA 19 (2014).
189. See infra Section III.A.4 discusses what level of reliance should trigger a disclosure requirement.
190. The question of what level of reliance on TK resources should trigger the requirement is
one of the key areas of contention on international deliberations. Additionally, a common theme in the
defense that patent applicants in alleged acts of biopiracy raise is that their reliance on TK resources
was only minimal or that they did not rely on such resource at all. Lack of novelty or non-obviousness
has affected many of the patent applications invalidated after TK evidence is produced, which implies
that the confusion regarding the level of reliance required to trigger TK resources is a big problem.
ROBINSON, supra note 20 (discussing several alleged cases of biopiracy).
191. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL JAMES MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 23 (2008); DAN L. BURK & MARK A.
LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 52 (2009); ADAM B. JAFFE &
JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS
ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 20 (2004).
192. The U.S. Constitution granted power to Congress “[t]o promote the progress of science and
useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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is granted for a claimed element that is not new, is obvious, or has not been
fully described, a monopoly is granted without the redeeming qualities of
innovation. An idea that should be shared freely at no or low-cost ends up
being locked up in an exclusive patent right for twenty years. Under the
social contract theory of patents, the public gets less than what it bargained
for while granting the exclusive right. There are multiple negative effects
of granting patent rights to undeserving claims.
Regarding financial costs, patent prosecution drains financial resources of the patent applicant, the PTO, and the court system (if the patent
is litigated post-grant). The cost of applying for a single patent could be
anywhere between $10,000–$30,000,193 and that cost would be higher for
the many applications that involve extensive negotiation with the examiner over validity and scope. Although the PTO is funded through fees it
collects for its services,194 the financial resources spent on patent prosecution are still a waste for the portion of patents that should not have been
granted. Furthermore, there are opportunity costs of the human resources
expended on the prosecution of undeserving patents.195 Then, there are
costs of litigation196 at the different levels of appeal that many stakeholders
want to reduce.197 Given that many stakeholders prioritize the reduction of
litigation costs in the patent system, the adoption of an information-forcing
rule that could create ex ante incentives198 that may reduce ex post costs
of litigation seems highly beneficial.
There are also costs associated with the granting of patent rights that
may not readily be described as financial costs. Non-innovative or overly
broad patents deter innovation in the relevant industry without providing
anything in return.199 The existence of an overly broad patent that should
193. The cost of patenting, starting from initial filling and including multiple responses to office
actions, etc., varies heavily based on the type of invention. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 30, at 1498;
Gene Quinn, The Cost of Obtaining a Patent in the US, IP WATCHDOG (Apr. 4, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/04/04/the-cost-of-obtaining-a-patent-in-the-us/id=56485.
194. See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, FY 2018 PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 120–21 (2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTOFY18PAR.pdf.
195. See generally Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why “Bad” Patents Survive in the Market
and How Should We change?—The Private and Social Costs of Patents, 55 EMORY L.J. 61, 87 (2006)
(explaining the pressure under which patent examiners work that results in the granting of undeserving
patent rights).
196. Professor Lemley had estimated the annual cost of patent litigation to be around $2.4 billion
in 2001. Given the increasing complexity and number of patent cases, that number should be significantly higher in recent years. See Lemley, supra note 30, at 1502.
197. The cost of litigation in patent law has been one of the issues of concern that the PTO, the
courts, and the White House have been attempting to address. See, e.g., Lawrence Hurley, U.S. High
Court Sets Record for Intellectual Property Caseload, REUTERS, Feb. 26, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-ip-analysis/u-s-high-court-sets-record-for-intellectual-property-caseload-idUSBREA1Q09B20140227.
198. Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 77, 79
(2005) (arguing for the benefit of creating ex ante incentives in the patent system).
199. There are many examples of patents being used to block innovation from developing in a
certain field. See, e.g., Mildred K. Cho et al., Effects of Patents and Licenses on the Provision of
Clinical Genetic Testing Services, 5 J. MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 3, 5 (2003) (providing empirical
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have either been invalidated or narrowed will have the effect of discouraging investment. Firms conducting research will fear that a patent right
may be asserted against them at any point in the research and development
(R&D) process.200 Additionally, vaguely worded claims create uncertainty
about the “metes and bounds” of the patent right, thereby creating unnecessary risk for innovators.201
There are other undesired outcomes particularly relevant to the context of TK use in inventive processes. Biopiracy and the granting of undeserving patent rights over TK use have forced many source communities
to mistrust researchers in general—and the patent system in particular.202
This mistrust underpins the protectionist trend discussed earlier.203 Furthermore, the granting of undeservingly broad patent rights, without recognizing the contributions of the source community, denies the community any benefits from the resulting innovation. More broadly, the absence
of recognition for the source community is a missed opportunity to create
a more inclusive patent system in which source communities that provide
TK resources and collaborate in research could feel a sense of belongingness.
3. Benefits of Disclosure
The above discussion shows that the context in which patent applicants use TK resources in their inventive process but withhold such information from the PTO meets the requirements for the scenarios that Ayres
and Gertner described in their article.204 The well-informed party (patent
applicant) behaves strategically by using privately held information (withholding information about the reliance on TK resources) to get private
benefits that are socially undesirable (undeservingly broad patent rights).
Thus, the requirement should be designed as an information-forcing rule
that would elicit socially desirable information from patent applicants.
There are multiple benefits to the patent system when the requirement
is complied with. The production of complete information benefits the

evidence of clinicians shying away from clinical testing because of the threat of patent infringement
or licensing costs); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998) (describing the proliferation of
patent right as being one of the problems barring the production of useful products and services in the
biomedical field).
200. The term research and development (R&D) is used to refer to the variety of steps that firms
take from the inception of an idea up to the point of marketing products.
201. Adam B. Jaffe & Josh Lerner, Innovation and Its Discontents, 6 INNOVATION POL’Y &
ECON. 27, 32 (2006).
202. Alison L. Hoare & Richard G. Tarasofsky, Asking and Telling: Can “Disclosure of Origin”
Requirements in Patent Applications Make a Difference?, 10 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 149, 150
(2007).
203. See supra Section II.B.
204. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37.
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PTO, source communities, competitors, and the public. First, it will increase the quality of issued patents205 by rejecting non-innovative claims
and by making issued patents provide more socially beneficial information. The requirement will mean that the patent applicant discloses one
of the key sources of input for her invention. This may lead patent examiners, who usually have considerable resource constraints,206 to use these
limited resources efficiently and target prior art from source communities
in their examination. This is especially useful in the TK context because
patent examiners usually focus on accessible sources such as patents or
scientific publications in their examination, while the overwhelming majority of TK is unpublished.207
Second, it will raise the cost of prosecuting low-value patents,
thereby enabling the use of PTO resources for more inventive claims208:
claims that improve on TK resources. Requiring applicants to disclose TK
use will increase the risk of invalidity of low-quality patents. Therefore,
the value of applying for these types of patents will significantly decrease,
while the added burden of complying with the requirement will increase
costs, albeit only slightly. If the quality of patent is very low, the requirement would change the cost-benefit analysis of such applications and disincentivize those types of applicants from going to the PTO. Third, the
patent office receives information essential for patent examination from
the least-cost provider (the patent applicant), which should reduce the cost
of prosecuting inventions that rely on TK resources. The PTO already has
over seventy TK databases that it can use to search for prior art.209 However, the databases are not comprehensive compared to the wealth of
knowledge held by indigenous and local communities.210 Therefore, patent
examiners would face transaction costs of accessing TK resources that are
not documented or are documented in a foreign language. Requiring the
applicant to disclose TK use will transfer the cost of prior art search to the
least cost provider: the patent applicant.
Compliance with the requirement will also have benefits for the
source communities. Source jurisdictions that have passed legislation on
TK access and benefit sharing can track the use of TK by researchers and
205. Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 198, at 70–71.
206. See generally Kesan & Gallo, supra note 195, at 66 (explaining the pressure under which
patent examiners work, which results in the granting of undeserving patent rights).
207. See Gebru, supra note 22, at 303.
208. See Parchamovsky & Wagner, supra note 198, at 71.
209. Alphabetical Listing of All TK Resources, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Mar. 24, 2016,
4:18 PM), https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/support-centers/scientific-and-technical-information-center-stic/alphabetical.
210. It is generally understood that the majority of the knowledge of indigenous peoples is undocumented and thus the databases that the PTO uses will include the undocumented knowledge of
the different indigenous communities around the world. See, e.g., Ghate Utkarsh, Documentation of
Traditional Knowledge: People’s Biodiversity Registers, in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT
PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE, AND SUSTAINABILITY 190, 191 (Christophe Bellman et al. eds.,
2003).
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enforce obligations arising out of these rules more efficiently by searching
for TK use through accessible patent databases. Source communities and
countries that engage in protectionism out of fear of biopiracy can be more
confident that they can enforce domestic legislation abroad on researchers
who gain access to TK resources. This confidence can, in turn, be expected
to result in a more collaborative and trusting relationship211 between the
various stakeholders involved in bioprospecting.
Compliance with the requirement would also enable competitors of
the applicant or source communities to challenge the validity or scope of
the claimed invention using the ex ante TK disclosure. Given the self-interest of competitors or source communities, the full force of the private
actor could be used as a tool to check the validity or scope of a patent
application. Following the AIA, third parties now have four different types
of challenges to a patent right: pre-issuance review, inter partes review,
post-grant review, and Covered Business Method Patent Review.212 A bioprospecting relationship in which researchers have increased access to
TK resources can be expected to result in the production of biopharmaceutical products cheaply and quickly. To achieve this socially desirable
outcome, the requirement should create the right incentives without imposing too much burden on patent applicants or the patent system.
4. Guidance for Policy
The information-forcing rule literature offers guidance on how to
craft an effective and efficient requirement. A well-drafted requirement
would be able to address concerns around legal uncertainty and innovation-deterring burdens while still being able to encourage the disclosure of
reliance on TK. If a default rule is to succeed in compelling information
from a well-informed party, it should be designed against the interest of
that party.213 It is because of this rule that the well-informed party reveals
the socially beneficial information. In the current context, the requirement
should create a penalty against the interest of an applicant, which points to
the need to adopt penalties of patent invalidity for applications that violate
the requirement. If the requirement is to be effective, the default-penalty
rule should put the patent applicant in a worse position than she would
have been in had she taken a risk and the risk materialized.
Three levels of reliance on TK could be used to further extrapolate
the trigger of an obligation under the requirement. First, the minimal level
of reliance could be described as “mere inspiration”—the inventor was inspired by what she understood from TK, but the traditional practice was
211. Source communities increasingly mistrust the patent system because it has been used as a
tool for biopiracy. See Hoare & Tarasofsky, supra note 202. The requirement has the potential of
developing trusting relationships.
212. 35 U.S.C. §§ 122(e), 311, 321 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.302 (2018).
213. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 98.
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not relevant for the development of the claimed invention. A relevant example here may be the rosy periwinkle plant, which is native to Madagascar and was traditionally used to treat diabetes.214 Scientists at Eli Lilly
and the University of Western Ontario, after years of research, learned that
the plant has cancer-fighting qualities.215 Eli Lilly used extracts from the
plant to develop vinblastine and vincristine—medicines used to treat
Hodgkin’s disease and childhood leukemia.216 If the TK of using the plant
for diabetes or processes of extracting ingredients did not contribute to the
development of vinblastine and vincristine,217 then the duty to disclose the
source of TK would be unreasonably burdensome. The inventors in this
case were inspired to test it for its cancer-treating potential after being
exposed to the traditional use of the plant to treat diabetes. Therefore, the
traditional use is not “material for patentability.” The claimed invention is
not substantively based on the TK. Thus, the scope of the patent right that
will ultimately issue is not affected by disclosure of the minimal input
from TK. Under this scenario, the patent applicant has an incentive to
abide by the requirement because the applicant has nothing to lose—disclosure will not affect the patent scope. However, as explained in Part I,218
the duty of candor and good faith is broader than the duty to disclose material information. Any information that an examiner might have wanted
to know should be included in this broader requirement of candor and good
faith. Still, the patent applicants have an incentive to disclose the traditional use of the rosy periwinkle to treat diabetes for the same reason stated
earlier.219
Second, a higher level of reliance on TK could be described as “substantial reliance” and could fairly give rise to a duty to disclose under 35
U.S.C. § 112 and Rule 56. Substantial reliance is a situation where, without access to the TK, the invention may not have been produced, or the
process would have taken significantly more time or resources. The neem
tree case discussed in the introduction to this Article is a good example of
this. Presuming that Mr. Larson knew that Indian farmers have been using
the neem tree extract as a pesticide and presuming a storage stable neem
tree extract was not in prior use, his patent application for a storage stable
neem tree extract to be used as a pesticide should be thought of as having
substantially relied on TK. This is especially the case if, as claimed by
214. MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? 136 (2003).
215. Srividhya Ragavan, Protection of Traditional Knowledge, MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV.,
2001, at 8; Roger A. Sedjo, Property Rights, Genetic Resources, and Biotechnological Change, 35
J.L. & ECON. 199, 199 (1992).
216. Shayana Kadidal, Plants, Poverty, and Pharmaceutical Patents, 103 YALE L.J. 223, 223
(1993).
217. BROWN, supra note 214, at 137 (discussing the challenges of assigning ownership in the
Rosy Periwinkle case).
218. See supra Section I.A.
219. See supra Section I.A. As discussed earlier, this is because failure to disclose a material
information may result in the invalidation of the patent right post-grant. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2018);
see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2018).
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representatives of W.R. Grace, the claimed compound and process resulted in increasing the stability of the extract from a couple of days to two
years.220 In this case, Mr. Larson and the scientists involved in the second
W.R. Grace patent should disclose that extracts of the neem tree have been
used in India as a pesticide because such information is “material for patentability.” The improvement in stability of the compound depends on the
extent of the traditional use in a stable neem tree extract.
In this second scenario, the level of reliance on TK is so substantial
that “but for” the use of TK, the claimed invention would not have been
developed. If the improvement does not develop something totally different, disclosure of “substantial reliance” on TK under this scenario may
narrow the scope of the patent right. If the penalty default is the reduction
of patent scope (or other similarly weak penalties such as the temporary
suspension of prosecution), the applicant would have an incentive to withhold information in hopes that the PTO or third parties will not discover
the information on their own. In other words, if the ex post discovery of a
violation of the requirement results in the same outcomes as an ex ante
disclosure, then the applicant has hardly any incentive to disclose. Therefore, legislators would need to address this incentive to withhold information by setting up a penalty resulting in the rejection of an application
or the invalidity of a granted patent.
The highest level of reliance could be a claim to an “invention” that
provides only minimal improvement on TK. Patent law standards of novelty221 and nonobviousness222 may be helpful here. The improvement
would be minimal if the traditional use of the resource anticipates it or if
it would be obvious to the average person in that field with knowledge of
the relevant TK. A good example here is the patenting of a process for
treating wounds by applying turmeric powder. In 1995, two researchers at
the University of Mississippi Medical Center, Soman K. Das and Hari Har
P. Cohly, received a U.S. patent.223 The patent covered a method of administering turmeric powder orally and topically to heal surgical wounds
and ulcers.224 People in India had used turmeric powder to treat wounds
for centuries.225 The Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR),
an agency of the Indian government, challenged the validity of the patent
in the PTO.226 The Council submitted thirty-two printed publications from
India providing evidence of the use of turmeric powder to heal wounds for
centuries.227 The PTO revoked all six claims in the patent for failing to
220. Shayana Kadidal, Subject-Mattter Imperialism? Biodiversity, Foreign Prior Art, and the
Neem Patent Controversy, 37 IDEA 371, 374–75 (1997).
221. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
222. Id. § 103.
223. Use of Turmeric in Wound Healing, U.S. Patent No. 5,401,504 (issued Mar. 28, 1995).
224. Id.
225. Prasad & Aggarwal, supra note 176, at 264.
226. Re-examination Certificate of U.S. Patent No. 5,401,504 (issued Apr. 21, 1998).
227. Id.
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meet substantive patentability requirements.228 Information about the reliance of TK in these scenarios is obviously material for patentability analysis. The patent application in this and other similar cases229 is claiming
rights over the traditional uses of a resource, provides only a minimal improvement or, in the worst of cases, no improvement is made to TK at all.
In these cases, Rule 56 would require the disclosure of TK.230 Furthermore,
the patent application in most of these cases will fail to meet the patentability requirements.
In this third scenario, the patent applicant has an incentive to violate
the requirement because compliance with the rule will result in the same
outcome as the penalty. In this scenario, the requirement will have little
incentive to disclose reliance on TK because the penalty for violation is
the same as the outcome from compliance. Thus, policy makers should
adopt a harsher penalty than patent invalidity. This includes disgorgement
of profits or levying fines. One additional benefit of the requirement to
note is that the penalty default will discourage researchers from going to
the PTO before making a considerable improvement on TK resources,
which is a socially desirable outcome. Thus, in addition to compelling information from applicants, the requirement may impact patenting behavior. The three scenarios outlined above are a simplified version of what
might happen in bioprospecting projects, and they are used here to illustrate the various incentive structure of the patent applicant.
Conceiving the requirement as an information-forcing default rule
solves two of the three issues of concern. First, it solves the questions of
what type of penalty to impose for violations of the requirement. If the
requirement is conceived of as an information-forcing rule, then the penalty for infringement in the first two cases would have to be a rejection of
a patent application and invalidity of a granted patent. For the third scenario, because the applicant knows she does not have a patentable invention in the first place, patent invalidity will not be sufficient. In these types
of cases, a harsher penalty such as disgorgement of profits or fines is
needed to compel information.

228. Id. Although the turmeric case shows a patent system working as it is supposed to, many
similar cases take many years of litigation and considerable expenses. One can imagine the numerous
cases in which TK may be used but remains unreported. See, e.g., ROBINSON, supra note 20.
229. There are multiple examples of cases in which the patent applicant simply requests patent
rights without making significant improvements. For instance, a Dutch company has received patents
in numerous countries over a gluten-free flour made from teff. Teff is a flour native to Ethiopia and
Eritrea and an input in injera, which is a spongy flat bread and a ubiquitous part of everyday meals in
both countries. The gluten-free nature of the flour is a natural result of the teff flour. While the U.S.
patent has been invalidated, a very similar European patent (Eur. Patent No. 1646287b1) is still in
force. See REGINE ANDERSEN & TONE WINGE, FRIDTJOF NANSENS INSTITUTE, THE ACCESS AND
BENEFIT-SHARING AGREEMENT ON TEFF GENETIC RESOURCES: FACTS AND LESSONS (2012),
http://www.abs-initiative.info/fileadmin/media/Knowledge_Center/Pulications/FNI/FNI-R0612.pdf.
230. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2018).
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For the first two scenarios, anything short of patent invalidity or nonenforcement would fail to encourage patent applicants to disclose their reliance on TK resources. A voluntary system in which patent applicants
will face no repercussions for noncompliance would mean a reasonable
applicant would not risk patent invalidity or the reduction of the scope of
her patent by providing potentially damaging information. There are no
benefits to doing so unless the applicant wants to fulfill some form of
moral obligation. The cost-benefit analysis is similar under a regime in
which the penalty is suspension of patent prosecution. If, for example, Mr.
Larson’s patent over storage stable neem tree extract would be narrowed
down upon his disclosure of traditional practices in India, he would initially take a risk of noncompliance. If on the off chance that the patent
examiner discovers the traditional practice in India (which in most cases
is very unlikely), then Mr. Larson can comply with the requirement. This
would result in most applicants being noncompliant.
Most cases of bioprospecting or biopiracy can be expected to fall under either the first or second scenario. This is because TK tends to involve
basic information231 about the benefits of biodiversity resources on which
researchers could relatively easily make considerable improvements. For
example, Indian farmers had used the neem tree as a pesticide for centuries,232 but the PTO found Mr. Larson’s “improvement”233 of creating a
storage stable neem tree extract innovative enough to grant it a patent.234
Furthermore, because of the uncertainty regarding the validity of a patent
application, patent applicants can reasonably expect that the scope of their
patent application will only be narrowed rather than completely rejected.
While a penalty is needed to encourage patent applicants to divulge
information, legislators should also consider the impact that such rules
may have on the incentive to obtain the information in the first place.235
One of the costs of the requirement is that the duty to disclose may discourage researchers from using TK resources in the first place.236 Thus,
legislators should ensure the requirement is an efficient one—that there
are sufficient incentives for researchers to use TK resources while ensuring that such use is disclosed to the PTO.
Second, the information-forcing rule’s literature provides answers to
the question of whether to request that patent applicants disclose the

231. Carvalho, supra note 111, at 244–45 (discussing the ease with which users can copy TK);
Mark C. Suchman, Invention and Ritual: Notes on the Interrelation of Magic and Intellectual Property
in Preliterate Societies, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1264, 1272 (1989) (describing the basic nature of TK).
232. BD. ON SCI. & TECH. FOR INT’L DEV., supra note 8, at 1.
233. Stable Anti-Pest Neem Seed Extract, supra note 1.
234. Id.
235. While penalizing nondisclosure has the effect of encouraging disclosure, if the penalty is so
significant, researchers may hesitate to acquire the information in the first place for fear of the potential
of being penalized. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 128.
236. Hoare & Tarasofsky, supra note 202, at 164.
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original source (or origin) of TK or just the source from which they received the resource. This is an important issue because many researchers
access TK through intermediaries such as research databases, databanks,
or gene banks.237 Many TK resources are conserved and used by multiple
communities, and these resources have predominantly been transmitted to
other cultures near and far.238 As per the information-forcing rules literature, forcing well-informed parties to incur further costs may block a transaction from taking place.239 The requirement of disclosing origin (as opposed to source) may discourage researchers from using TK in the first
place. Therefore, the requirement should not compel patent applications to
conduct prior art searches more than they already did during the research
that led to a claimed invention. If the penalty of patent invalidity, disgorgement of profits, and fines are adopted, then a requirement to conduct an
additional search for relevant TK resources would be too tasking. This is
especially the case given the inaccessibility of TK resources and the challenges of tracking original sources. Therefore, the requirement should only
require that patent applicants disclose TK-related information the researcher used and discovered in the normal course of research rather than
imposing a positive obligation to disclose the original source of TK or
other relevant information.240
In addition to the ex ante benefits of compelling patent applicants to
disclose potentially damaging information, the requirement has important
ex post benefits. As explained earlier, patent examiners are at a disadvantage because of the information asymmetry inherent in patent prosecution.241 The disclosure of reliance on TK would enable competitors of the
applicant, source communities, and the public to assess the validity or
scope of claimed inventions. This ex post benefit harnesses the private interest of competitors and source communities in ensuring the applicant
does not get a broader patent right than she deserves. This ex post benefit
is essential given the significant resource restraints that the PTO faces. The
ex post benefits of disclosure also include the facilitation of the enforcement of rules around access to TK and benefit sharing that source communities and countries may have established. Furthermore, just like the general disclosure requirement is useful in creating spillover effects from the
disclosure of useful information to the public, the disclosure of reliance on
TK in the development of a claimed invention may encourage competitors
of the applicant to research the TK for similar purposes. The value of such
237. See GRAHAM DUTFIELD, QUAKER UNITED NATIONS OFFICE, OCCASIONAL PAPER 18,
THINKING ALOUD ON DISCLOSURE OF ORIGIN 3 (2005).
238. See OGUAMANAM, supra note 23, at 18; see also MANUEL RUIZ MULLER, INT’L CTR. FOR
TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., ISSUE PAPER 3, PROTECTING SHARED AND WIDELY DISTRIBUTED
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: ISSUES, CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS 8–9 (2013).
239. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 128.
240. Patent applicants do not have an obligation to conduct prior art searches. Their obligation
is to disclose material information in their possession. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2018).
241. See supra Section III.A.2.b.
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information may be significant given reports of bioprospectors focusing
on selected TK resources for further investigation.242
Lastly, one of the recurring challenges in the literature on bioprospecting is understanding the actual value of TK resources in bioprospecting projects. While source communities and some scholars argue
that the resources have considerable value,243 some firms argue that they
either do not use TK at all,244 or that the value of such resources is very
minimal.245 The lack of information about the extent of the reliance of the
industry on TK contributes to the confusion on the correct policy measure
that should govern bioprospecting projects. The requirement could address
this concern by providing clear information on the value of TK as an input
in inventive ideas. This does not mean that the full value of TK could be
evaluated based on the disclosure in patent applications. But disclosure
could shed some light on the value that should be put on TK as an input in
producing innovative products.
B. Reversing the Protectionist Trend
A requirement designed as an information-forcing rule will have innovation-encouraging effects instead of being a burden on the patent system as argued by some. The requirement has the potential to reverse the
rising and inefficient protectionist trend outlined earlier. To achieve this
goal, the requirement would have to strike a balance between interests of
source communities and TK users246 such as researchers and modern
firms. If the requirement addresses the interests of source communities
without meeting the needs of users, then the intervention might discourage
the engagement that users would have with TK. If the requirement addresses the interests of users without satisfying the needs of source communities, it will fail to change the current trends of protectionism.
The past experiences of researchers accessing TK, developing products, and failing to recognize the contributions of the source community
have created significant trust issues.247 Decades of alleged biopiracy have
made source communities hesitant to share their resource. To overcome
this mistrust, a robust and clear signal of change from the status quo is
needed. Because existing patent law is considered to be part of the problem

242.
243.
244.

See Rausser & Small, supra note 96, at 173.
See supra Section II.A for a discussion of the value of TK.
See Dominic Keating, The WIPO IGC: A U.S. Perspective, in THE WIPO
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. & GENETIC RES., TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE & FOLKLORE, PROTECTING TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 265, 271 (Daniel F. Robinson,
Ahmed Abdel-Latif & Pedro Roffe eds. 2017).
245. See Jim Chen, There’s No Such Thing as Biopiracy . . . And It’s a Good Thing Too, 37
MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 25–28 (2006).
246. The term “users” refers to multiple entities that rely on TK in their inventive process. This
includes for-profit firms, public research institutions, and independent researchers.
247. See Shiva & Holla-Bhar, supra note 10, at 151.
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by source communities,248 minor tinkering may fail to send the strong signal needed to reverse the protectionist trend.
The introduction of the requirement should take into consideration its
effects on users. Users can be expected to be interested in legal certainty
about the contents of the requirement and penalties for violations.249 Researchers interested in using TK resources may be discouraged if they have
doubts about their obligations and potential penalties. Additionally, users
with a for-profit orientation can also be expected to emphasize costs associated with access to TK and requests for benefit sharing if an innovative
product is produced. Policy makers should seriously consider these interests to craft an efficient and workable requirement.
The requirement can undo the lose–lose relationship in the status quo
by giving source communities (the party with weaker bargaining power)
some leverage to enforce rules that the community may place around access and benefit sharing. This leverage can encourage source communities
and biodiversity-rich countries to be more open and willing to engage in
R&D collaborations with researchers.
The use of databases provides a good example of how a collaborative
relationship between source communities and users would work. Instead
of screening resources for potential value, researchers could use the
knowledge of indigenous peoples and local communities as research leads.
Take the example of the TKDL. The more than 250,000 medicinal formulations documented in the database could be a great source to develop
modern drugs. A collaborative (as opposed to restrictive) use of the contents could create significant welfare gains for patients everywhere. Biopharmaceutical firms could use their impressive resources to screen the
database for promising research leads. However, in the absence of an effective mechanism that can convince source communities that they will
share from the benefits arising out of follow-on innovation, they may not
be willing to engage in this collaborative and welfare-enhancing endeavor.
IV. INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS
If one accepts that the requirement should be introduced, then several
institutional questions arise. This Section outlines the institutional mechanism for introducing the requirement in U.S. patent law. It argues that
amending the Patent Act to introduce an explicit requirement compelling
applicants to disclose the source of TK may be the most effective mechanism to signal a change in U.S. patent policy and establish confidence
among source communities and countries. However, amending U.S. patent
law to introduce the requirement seems infeasible given the lack of political interest to introduce such an amendment and the considerable opposition that may be expected from industry. Therefore, this Section suggests
248. Id. at 152.
249. See Tim Roberts, The Protection of Traditional Knowledge: An Industry View, in U.N.
CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., supra note 92, at 93, 93.
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that clarifying the duties of disclosure, candor, and good faith that patent
applications already have, by explicitly introducing the requirement,
would be a feasible second-best measure. It also argues that the PTO, as
the most suitable administrative agency for patent examination, should be
tasked with checking for compliance with the requirement.
The key institutional questions that may arise include: (1) How
should the requirement be formalized?; (2) Which entity is best suited to
check for compliance?; (3) What should be the content of the required disclosure?; (4) What should trigger the obligation?; (5) What should be the
penalty for noncompliance?; and (6) Who should have standing? These
questions are dealt with in further detail below.
A. How Should the Requirement Be Formalized?
Considering the twin goals of compelling socially beneficial information from patent applicants and reversing a rising protectionist trend,
amending the Patent Act to introduce an explicit requirement may be the
most effective mechanism. The many cases of biopiracy happened in the
face of existing disclosure obligations under U.S. patent law. Therefore,
an explicit amendment of the Patent Act would send a strong signal of
policy change in U.S. patent policy and would establish confidence among
source communities and countries. This strong signal is needed to reverse
the rising protectionist trend in which source communities and countries
create barriers to access TK. Dozens of countries around the world, including some industrialized nations, have amended their patent act to introduce
the requirement.250 Although it is too early to observe the impact of the
reform, early evidence suggests that there have not been significant negative effects in the domestic patent systems of these countries.251
Reforming U.S. patent law to reflect policy changes is not a new endeavor. The Patent Act has been amended multiple times since its first
iteration in 1790252 with the most recent amendment—the AIA253—
enacted in 2011 to modernize the U.S. patent system. Therefore, amending
the Patent Act to include the requirement is not an implausible idea. In
fact, the 1980 Bayh-Dole amendment254 to the Patent Act has similar features to the requirement. The AIA brought about major changes in U.S.
250. For a latest list of countries with some form of a requirement to disclose the source of TK
used in the inventive process, see WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT
TABLE (2017),
www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/documents/pdf/genetic_resources_disclosure.pdf.
251. See Bagley, supra note 16, at 736–40.
252. Patents Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1970).
253. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
254. The Bayh-Dole amendment is codified in 35 U.S.C. Chapter 18. While there are many similarities between the requirement and the disclosure required under the Bayh-Dole Act, there are significant limitations. While the subject matter of both requirements deals with upstream innovation,
and thus share some features, the Bayh-Dole Act deals with improvements that can easily meet the
patentability requirement, while most TK resources do not meet core patentability requirements.
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patent law, one of which relates to a disclosure requirement. The Act mandates that any invention that uses federal funds in the inventive process
include, on the face of issued patents, a disclosure of the government’s
interest in the patent.255 The Bayh-Dole disclosure has enabled the U.S.
government to track federally funded inventions, thereby facilitating the
enforcement of obligations that the inventor and contractors have under
the Act.256 A carefully crafted requirement can have a similar tracking effect in facilitating the enforcement of access and benefit-sharing agreements between source communities or countries and researchers.257
However, amending U.S. patent law to introduce the requirement
seems infeasible considering the lack of political interest in the amendment and the considerable opposition that may be expected from the industry. Therefore, clarifying the duties of disclosure, candor, and good
faith that patent applicants already have by introducing an explicit requirement would be a feasible second-best measure. As stated earlier, patent
applicants already have a very broad duty of disclosure as stated in the
Patent Act, under federal rules, and in the case law.258 Thus, updating the
federal rules and the PTO manual to include an explicit requirement would
be an efficient and feasible reform that can satisfy the twin benefits identified in this Article.
B. Which Institution Is Best Suited?
The general duty of disclosure is owed to the PTO. The requirement
imposed on patent applicants to describe the invention in “full, clear, concise, and exact terms” relates to the specification section of a patent application.259 The first entity that examines the patent application, including
the specification section, is the PTO. Although courts have the power to
review the validity of granted patents, there is a presumption of patent validity260 and a level of deference courts grant the PTO prosecution.261 Furthermore, the rules under 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) clearly state that the duty of

255. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(6) (2018). The provision highlights the disclosure requirement that
should be inserted in funding agreements. It states that contractor has an obligation “to include within
the specification of such application and any patent issuing thereon, a statement specifying that the
invention was made with Government support.” Id.
256. WENDY H. SCHACHT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32076, THE BAYH-DOLE ACT:
SELECTED ISSUES IN PATENT POLICY AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF TECHNOLOGY 7 (2013).
257. See Carvalho, supra note 111, at 163; see also Bagley, supra note 16, at 741–42.
258. See supra Section I.A.
259. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2018).
260. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a). “A patent shall be presumed valid. Each claim of a patent (whether in
independent, dependent, or multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid independently of the
validity of other claims; dependent or multiple dependent claims shall be presumed valid even though
dependent upon an invalid claim. The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof
shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.” Id.
261. Arti Rai, Addressing the Patent Gold Rush: The Role of Deference to PTO Patent Denials,
2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 199, 221–22 (2000).
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disclosure exists “in dealing with the Office.”262 These rules extends beyond the examiner to include anyone at the PTO.263 It seems that the rules
direct the general duty to disclose towards the PTO, at least initially, because it is the most suitable entity to check for compliance with the rules.
Since the duty of disclosure is directed at the PTO, it seems reasonable to
also direct a duty to disclose to the same organ. This should especially be
the case if the requirement is introduced through an updated MPEP that
includes an explicit requirement.
The literature from administrative law supports this conclusion. The
general theory in administrative law is that administrative agencies are
best suited to interpret rules governing activities in their area of expertise.264 This theory also applies in deciding the level of information that
should be submitted for proceedings in that agency.265 Given the unique
position of the Federal Circuit as a specialized appeals court for patent
cases, patent law was considered to be different from regulatory areas
where administrative law theories applied.266 However, the AIA granted
the PTO considerable administrative power to decide key issues regarding
patent validity.267 Considering its newly expanded powers, the PTO should
be the first entity that decides whether an applicant has complied with the
requirement. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that the PTO
has considerable expertise—both regarding technical knowledge and patent prosecution. This, however, does not mean that the Patent Trials and
Appeals Board (PTAB) or the courts should not review these decisions.
The requirement, like other requirements in U.S. patent law, should be reviewable by the courts.
C. What Should Be the Content of the Required Disclosure?
As highlighted in earlier Sections,268 the requirement should entail an
obligation to disclose the source from which the patent applicant received
TK instead of the origin of the resource. Requiring patent applicants to
conduct further research to identify the original source of the TK would
create a considerable disincentive against relying on TK resources. The
origin of the majority of TK resources is controversial and, therefore, requiring researchers to investigate and disclose the origin creates a duty that

262. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2018).
263. MPEP, supra note 69, § 2001.03. The duty extends to proceedings at the Patent Trial and
Appeal Board and the Office of the Commissioner for Patents. Id.
264. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 521–24
(1978); see also Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 511 (1989).
265. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348 (2001).
266. Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Deference and Patent Exceptionalism, 65 DUKE L.J.
ONLINE 149, 158 (2016).
267. Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for the
PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1959, 1976 (2013).
268. See supra Section III.A.
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is far from the scientific research in which firms have expertise.269 As the
information-forcing rules literature reveals, rules should not be applied if
the net effect could result in a disincentive to participate in the “deal” in
the first place.270 Limiting the content of required disclosure only to the
source from which the applicant received TK ensures that the requirement
does not impose an undue burden that may deter innovation.271 This may
create an opportunity for strategic behavior where patent applicants would
select a jurisdiction that does not have domestic access and benefit-sharing
rules to avoid having to comply with rules in the actual source jurisdiction.
But, because this risk seems highly limited considering the heavy penalty
for fraud and inequitable conduct, legislators should not drive away researchers for fear of such a limited risk of strategic behavior.
D. What Should Trigger the Obligation?
Based on the three levels of reliance outlined earlier, the trigger for
the requirement should be a substantial reliance standard. Patent applicants should have a duty to disclose if they would not have developed the
claimed invention or if the invention would take considerable time and
resources without the reliance on TK. This includes examples such as the
neem tree patent where the development of storage stable neem tree extract
for use as a pesticide would face additional risks had it not been for the
traditional use of the resource as a pesticide.272
A broad interpretation of “substantial reliance” is suggested in this
Article. The balance between requiring a specific type of reliance (substantial) but accepting a broad range of inputs as triggering the requirement
strikes an efficient balance that would meet a key purpose of the requirement—disclosure of relevant information without significantly affecting
the incentive to innovate. Such a standard is expected to encourage source
communities to provide increased access to TK resources while ensuring
that they are not cheated out of their equitable share by strategic patent
claim drafting.
E. What Should Be the Penalty for Noncompliance?
Countries around the world have adopted a wide range of penalties
for noncompliance with their domestic requirement to disclose the source
of TK used in inventive processes.273 These penalties include the suspension of a patent application until the applicant fulfills her obligation under
the requirement, the rejection of the patent application, and the invalidity
269. The preference for source instead of origin has also been suggested by some scholars. See
DUTFIELD, supra note 237, at 2.
270. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 91.
271. See, e.g., Keating, supra note 244, at 270–71.
272. Shiva, supra note 2.
273. For a latest list of countries with some form of a requirement to disclose the source of TK
used in the inventive process, see WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., supra note 250.
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or unenforceability of a granted patent. Some jurisdictions have also
adopted criminal sanctions in the form of fines or imprisonment. In contrast to these penalties, some jurisdictions have adopted a voluntary system
in which patent applicants are encouraged to disclose TK, but noncompliance will have no repercussion.274
The penalty for noncompliance advocated for in this Article ranges
from the rejection of the patent application or (if a patent application has
been granted) the invalidity or unenforceability of the patent right, to fines,
and disgorgement of profits in extreme cases. The twin functions of the
requirement outlined below—its information-forcing function275 and the
reversal of a rising protectionist trend276—would not be satisfied if the requirement is voluntary. If patent applicants are left to their own will in
disclosing potentially damaging information about their reliance on TK
resources, it can be presumed that a reasonable applicant would choose to
withhold such information. The information-forcing nature of the requirement emanates from a penalty rule that is set against the interest of the
well-informed party.277 In the absence of such a penalty, a reasonable patent applicant will act strategically by withholding information about their
reliance on TK and the source that provided such a resource. While the
penalty for minimal and substantial reliance should be rejection of the application, patent invalidity, or patent unenforceability, the penalty for
those who only make minimal improvements should include fines or disgorgement of profits. In the absence of harsher penalties than patent invalidity, an applicant who knows their application would fail patentability
examination would have little interest to disclose the damaging information. The penalty in an ex post finding of noncompliance would be the
same as the ex ante risk of withholding the information, and thus the requirement would fail to produce the desired information-eliciting function.
These suggestions about the forms of penalty are supported by the two
goals of the requirement outlined in this Article—the ability of the requirement to compel socially beneficial information and its effect in reversing
the rising protectionist trend.
F. Who Should Have Standing?
Patent rights, as “rights to exclude” others from making and using a
claimed invention, have considerable public interest implications. As a result, the U.S. patent system allows third parties to challenge the validity or
scope of patent rights based on a wide range of doctrines.278 Although the
patent examiner is the first person who works to ensure the application
274. See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on
a European Community Biodiversity Directive, at 6, COM (1998) 42 final (Feb. 4, 1998),
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:51998DC0042&from=EU.
275. See supra Section III.A.
276. See supra Section III.B.
277. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 123–24.
278. See 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2018) (inter partes review); 35 U.S.C. § 321 (post-grant review).
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meets the patentability requirements, interested third parties are allowed,
through many channels, to challenge the validity or scope of a claimed
invention.279 The AIA has expanded the opportunity that third parties have
to challenge patents before280 and after281 the patent has been granted.282
Any party with a “legally cognizable injury” has standing to challenge a
claim in a patent application or against a granted patent.283 This includes
competitors of the applicant and third parties that may be affected by the
potential enforcement of the patent right.
Failure to comply with the requirement may impact competitors,
source communities, and the public by granting exclusive patent rights to
undeserving claims. Therefore, these stakeholders should have standing to
bring a challenge against a patent that violates the requirement. Competitors may be affected because the patentee may bring an infringement
lawsuit against them after the patent issues. Source communities may be
affected because the patentee may use the exclusive right in ways that affect the traditional use of their TK or the importation of products based on
the TK into the United States284 In case source communities are unable to
bring a challenge, for example, because they are not well organized, the
countries in which such communities reside should be able to bring a challenge. Furthermore, given the considerable public interest in the granting
of an undeserving patent right, nongovernmental organizations and other
entities working in the relevant industry (e.g., environmental conservation,
agricultural management, biopharmaceutical research) should have
standing to challenge a claimed invention for noncompliance with the requirement.
Consultation should be undertaken with all relevant stakeholders including industry associations and leaders, indigenous peoples and local
communities, and government agencies within and outside of the United
States. The PTO could engage with other patent offices that have been
implementing some version of a requirement that compels the disclosure
of the source of TK used in research. The PTO can develop best practices
and learn from challenges faced in other patent offices. Through the policy

279. For discussions on the changes brought about by the AIA and its implication for U.S. patent
law, see Robert A. Armitage, Understanding the America Invents Act and Its Implications for Patenting, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 10 (2012).
280. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 8, 125 Stat. 284,
315–16 (2011) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 122 to add a new subsection (e)).
281. Id. § 6, 125 Stat. 284, 299 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 321).
282. The AIA introduced Post-Grant Review (PGR), and Inter Partes Review (IPR); while Ex
Parte Re-examination (EPR) was introduced in 1981. Id.
283. See John F. Duffy, Standing to Challenge Patents, Enforcement Risk, and Separation of
Powers, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 628, 629 (2015).
284. See Neil D. Hamilton, Legal Issues Shaping Society’s Acceptance of Biotechnology and
Genetically Modified Organisms, 6 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 81, 106 (2001).
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guidance and institutional mechanisms outlined above, the PTO could introduce an effective requirement that addresses concerns around legal uncertainty and innovation-deterring burdens.
G. How Would the Requirement Benefit Source Communities?
An important question that may arise from the description of the requirement provided in this Article is how the requirement may benefit
source communities. An increasing number of source countries either have
or are in the process of introducing domestic legislation285 that provide
obligations around benefit sharing from the use of TK. Source countries
can use the disclosure of reliance on TK provided in U.S. patent applications to track and enforce obligations of benefit sharing that are included
in their domestic legislation. The requirement gives the laws of source
countries some teeth by facilitating its enforcement. This, of course, requires that the source country have domestic legislation that includes obligations of benefit sharing. Because U.S. courts enforce foreign judgements in many areas of law,286 judgments based on violations of the source
country’s benefit-sharing laws should be similarly enforced in the United
States.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued for the introduction of an explicit requirement
in U.S. patent law that compels patent applicants to disclose the source of
TK they used in their inventive process. While most of the literature has
focused on the international aspect, this Article analyzed the costs and benefits of introducing the requirement in the United States. The Article
makes two arguments that should convince legislators to explicitly introduce the requirement in U.S. patent law. First, the Article makes the normative case for conceiving the requirement as an information-forcing rule.
Understood this way, the benefits of the requirement are that it would create an efficient patent examination by eliciting socially beneficial information about the validity and scope of a claimed application from the
low-cost providers of such information—patent applicants.
Second, the Article argues that explicitly introducing the requirement
has potential to reverse a rising protectionist trend in which source communities and countries are increasing restrictions on access to TK. This
trend threatens to disrupt promising practices in which researchers build
on TK resources to develop welfare-enhancing products and services. By
granting source communities and countries the ability to track use of their
TK and enforce domestic laws or contracts in which researchers have obligations, the requirement creates confidence in the patent system and encourages increased access and collaboration.
285. For a latest list of countries with some form of a requirement to disclose the source of TK
used in the inventive process, see WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., supra note 250.
286. William C. Strum, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 95 COM. L.J. 200, 201 (1990).
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Conceiving the requirement as an information-forcing penalty rule
provides key insights into what form the requirement should take to meet
its goal of encouraging innovation while ensuring equitable sharing of
benefits with source communities. The literature on information-forcing
rules suggests that the requirement should only require patent applicants
to disclose the source from which they received TK so as not to discourage
them from engaging in TK-related research in the first place. The literature
also suggests that if the requirement is to provide its information-forcing
effect the penalty for nondisclosure should be a rejection of the patent application and the invalidity or unenforceability of granted patents.
To further address concerns about the requirement, the Article outlined three levels of reliance on TK that may have different implications
for the duty to disclose. Minimal reliance on the resource in which the
inventor is inspired by TK but develops the claimed invention independently of TK should not trigger a duty under the requirement. However, “substantial reliance” in which the applicant would not have invented
the claimed invention “but for” the reliance on TK should trigger an obligation to disclose. Substantial reliance should include cases in which the
use of TK resulted in the reduction of time or resources necessary to develop a claimed invention.
A carefully calibrated requirement that follows the guidelines outlined above can address concerns around legal uncertainty and the creation
of innovation-deterring burdens. Introduction of the requirement in U.S.
patent law could create a world in which researchers have increased access
to TK resources, such as the 250,000 medical formulations in the Indian
TK database, to develop products and services in return for an equitable
sharing of benefits with source communities or countries. This is important
for the U.S. economy considering the dominance of U.S. firms in sectors
that rely on TK for part of their innovative output, including the biopharmaceutical and agricultural industries. The Article advocates for amendment of the federal rules and PTO manual as the most feasible channel to
explicitly introduce the requirement, which, if carefully calibrated, would
create more efficient patent examination and reverse the rising protectionist trend.

